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CAMPAIGN SPEECH LAW WITH A TWIST: WHEN THE
GOVERNMENT IS THE SPEAKER, NOT THE REGULATOR
Helen Norton*
ABSTRACT
Although government entities frequently engage in issue-related campaign
speech on a variety of contested ballot and legislative measures, this fact has
been entirely overlooked in contemporary First Amendment debates over
campaign speech law specifically and government speech more generally. The
Supreme Court’s “campaign speech” and “government speech” dockets have
focused to date on claims by private parties that the government has restricted
or silenced their speech in violation of the First Amendment. In contrast,
disputes over what this Article calls “governmental campaign speech” involve
Free Speech Clause and other challenges by private parties who seek instead
to silence the government’s speech on matters subject to vote by members of
the public or their elected representatives.
This Article thus explores when, if ever, governmental campaign speech on
contested ballot and legislative measures is sufficiently dangerous to justify a
departure from the general rule that the government’s own speech is insulated
from Free Speech Clause review. This inquiry invites important and
challenging questions about both the nature of government and the nature of
speech, valuably forcing us to think about how government does, and should,
work—as well as how speech does, and should, work. To this end, this Article
reexamines the constitutionality of governmental campaign speech by
incorporating perspectives offered by the emerging—but so far entirely
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separate—constitutional debates over campaign finance reform
government speech.

and

This Article contends that government speech on issue campaigns generally
furthers, rather than frustrates, key First Amendment interests. Transparently
governmental campaign speech often provides great value to the public: it
enhances political accountability by informing voters of their governments’
priorities and preferences, provides a valuable heuristic for those who do not
or cannot evaluate the competing arguments for themselves, and adds to the
marketplace of available ideas and arguments, especially (but not only) as a
counter to expression from powerful, private sources.
The Article also identifies limits to its general proposition that the
government’s campaign speech is constitutionally valuable. First, it
emphasizes that the government should be permitted to assert the government
speech defense to constitutional challenges to its campaign speech on
contested ballot or legislative measures only when that speech is transparently
governmental in origin—when the public can clearly identify the message’s
governmental origins and thus hold the government politically accountable for
its views. Second, it distinguishes government campaign speech that involves
government’s endorsement of political candidates, concluding that
governmental bodies’ campaign speech endorsing or opposing specific
candidates raises greater threats to constitutional interests in preventing the
self-perpetuation of incumbents and the entrenchment of political power.
Finally, it highlights the availability of statutory and other nonconstitutional
limits on government campaign speech, concluding that such constraints are
constitutionally permissible yet often unwise as a policy matter in light of such
expression’s great instrumental value to the public. It urges instead that
policymakers carefully target such constraints to address specific instances of
abusive government speech.
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INTRODUCTION
Among the most contentious First Amendment controversies in recent
decades have been those over federal, state, and local government efforts to
regulate private parties’ campaign speech. This longstanding debate features
vigorous disagreements over whether private entities’ campaign speech is
sufficiently unique to justify, if not require, special First Amendment rules.1
Some argue that restrictions on private individuals’ or organizations’ campaign
contributions or spending improve the quality of political speech by limiting its
quantity,2 while others maintain that such constraints on expression’s quantity
undermine the First Amendment interests of both speakers and listeners.3
Contemporary First Amendment controversies also include those over the
Supreme Court’s “recently minted” government speech doctrine,4 which has
focused to date on untangling competing claims by public and private entities
to the same expression.5 These disputes involve Free Speech Clause claims by
private parties who argue that the government has impermissibly silenced,
excluded, or punished their speech. The government, in turn, argues that it was
instead speaking itself and thus entitled to prevent others from changing,
joining, or otherwise garbling its own message.6 Whether the contested speech
is characterized as private or governmental in origin drives the applicable—
and generally outcome-determinative—First Amendment analysis: although
the Free Speech Clause constrains government’s power to regulate private
speech,7 the Court has made clear that the government’s own speech is exempt
from Free Speech Clause scrutiny.8
1 See Frederick Schauer & Richard H. Pildes, Electoral Exceptionalism and the First Amendment, 77
TEX. L. REV. 1803 (1999) (exploring the possibility of First Amendment doctrine unique to expression
concerning political campaigns and elections).
2 See, e.g., Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876, 903–04 (2010); Davis v. FEC, 554 U.S. 724, 741
(2008); McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 205 (2003), overruled in part by Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. 876;
Austin v. Mich. State Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652, 658–59 (1990), overruled by Citizens United, 130
S. Ct. 876; Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 48 (1976) (per curiam).
3 See, e.g., Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 893; Davis, 554 U.S. at 736; McConnell, 540 U.S. at 134–40;
Austin, 494 U.S. at 656; Buckley, 424 U.S. at 15.
4 See Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, 129 S. Ct. 1125, 1139 (2009) (Stevens, J., concurring).
5 For a more extensive discussion of the Supreme Court’s brief history with government speech, see
Helen Norton & Danielle Keats Citron, Government Speech 2.0, 87 DENV. U. L. REV. 899, 904–16 (2010).
6 See, e.g., Summum, 129 S. Ct. at 1129–30.
7 E.g., Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 641 (1994) (recounting the First Amendment’s
bar on government’s viewpoint-based discrimination against private speech); R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505
U.S. 377, 382 (1992) (“The First Amendment generally prevents government from proscribing speech, or even
expressive conduct, because of disapproval of the ideas expressed. Content-based regulations are
presumptively invalid.” (citations omitted)); Police Dep’t of Chi. v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 95 (1972) (“[A]bove
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Entirely overlooked in both sets of discussions, however, is the fact that the
government frequently engages in issue-related campaign speech of its own on
a variety of contested ballot and legislative measures. Indeed, such expression
has generated considerable controversy at various times but has yet to be
analyzed in light of contemporary First Amendment debates over the potential
value and danger of private parties’ campaign speech (and governmental
efforts to regulate it), as well as over the potential value and danger of
government’s own speech more generally. The Court’s entirely separate
“campaign speech” and “government speech” dockets have thus focused to
date on claims by private parties that the government has impermissibly
restricted or silenced their speech. In contrast, disputes over what I call
“governmental campaign speech” involve Free Speech Clause and other
challenges by private parties who seek instead to silence the government’s
speech that expresses a position on matters subject to vote by members of the
public or their elected representatives—pending ballot initiatives and
referenda,9 as well as legislative measures.10
For purposes of this Article, such “governmental campaign speech” means
speech to the public (rather than to other government entities) that expresses

all else, the First Amendment means that government has no power to restrict expression because of its
message, its ideas, its subject matter, or its content.”).
8 Under the Supreme Court’s government speech doctrine, the government’s own expression is insulated
from Free Speech Clause challenges by plaintiffs who seek to alter or join that expression. See Summum, 129
S. Ct. at 1131 (“If [public entities] were engaging in their own expressive conduct, then the Free Speech
Clause has no application. The Free Speech Clause restricts government regulation of private speech; it does
not regulate government speech. A government entity has the right to ‘speak for itself.’ . . . Indeed, it is not
easy to imagine how government could function if it lacked this freedom.” (citations omitted) (quoting Bd. of
Regents v. Southworth, 529 U.S. 217, 229 (2000))); Johanns v. Livestock Mktg. Ass’n, 544 U.S. 550, 553
(2005) (explaining that the government’s own speech is “exempt” from Free Speech Clause scrutiny); see also
Southworth, 529 U.S. at 235 (“When the government speaks, for instance to promote its own policies or to
advance a particular idea, it is, in the end, accountable to the electorate and the political process for its
advocacy. If the citizenry objects, newly elected officials later could espouse some different or contrary
position.”).
9 A referendum generally enables citizens to enact or reject statutes or constitutional amendments
proposed by a legislature, while an initiative enables citizens to draft proposals themselves and submit them
directly to the populace for a vote. Ethan J. Leib, Can Direct Democracy Be Made Deliberative?, 54 BUFF. L.
REV. 903, 904 (2006).
10 I acknowledge that many use the term “campaign speech” more narrowly to refer only to speech on
matters subject to vote directly by the people themselves—ballot measures and candidate elections. As
discussed in more detail below, however, my definition of government speech on “issue campaigns” also
includes the government’s speech on pending legislation subject to vote by the people’s representatives,
because a number of critics urge that such efforts pose constitutional threats very similar to the threats they
perceive posed by the government’s speech on ballot measures to be decided directly by the people. See infra
notes 41–46, 60–67, and accompanying text.
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the official view of a governmental branch or body, such as speech issued
collectively in the form of a resolution or proclamation, or speech by an
official empowered to speak for that governmental entity. It does not include
speech by individual government officials expressing their own views in a
personal, nongovernmental capacity—e.g., when a governor endorses a
particular candidate for Senate on her own time and without any expenditure of
government resources. Moreover, as discussed in greater detail in Part III, this
Article distinguishes between governmental speech on issue campaigns—
governmental speech that takes a position on a pending ballot or legislative
measure—from governmental speech on candidate campaigns.
Governmental speech on issue campaigns takes a wide variety of forms and
may be delivered by a broad range of government speakers. Examples include
not only government officials’ statements and press releases critical or
supportive of pending ballot or legislative measures but also government
agencies’ reports and analyses, as well as flyers, pamphlets, newsletter articles,
online postings, and print and broadcast advertisements communicating their
views of such measures to the public.
Critics of such government expression (who include a variety of courts,
policymakers, and commentators) argue that the government should refrain
from taking sides in such contested policy contests. They maintain that the
government’s campaign speech on ballot and legislative measures sufficiently
differs from that of other participants in the political marketplace of ideas to
require the government’s exclusion from that market, asserting more
specifically that the government’s campaign speech undermines both speakers’
and listeners’ autonomy and equality interests. Controversies over such speech
include those over the Eisenhower Administration’s advocacy on behalf of its
proposed health care legislation,11 state human rights agencies’
communications in support of the Equal Rights Amendment,12 and local school
boards’ expressive support for school bond measures.13 Such debates still rage
today: the Fourth Circuit recently considered a First Amendment challenge to a
public school board’s communications to potential voters in opposition to
pending school voucher legislation,14 and a sharply divided Sixth Circuit
recently rejected a similar challenge to a town’s use of public funds to express

11
12
13
14

See infra notes 78–79 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 33–34 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 24–28 and accompanying text.
Page v. Lexington Cnty. Sch. Dist. One, 531 F.3d 275, 277–80, 287–88 (4th Cir. 2008).
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its position on ballot measures related to the local fire department’s financing
and organization.15
This Article seeks to reexamine longstanding controversies over
governmental campaign speech by drawing upon lessons from contemporary
First Amendment debates over campaign finance reform and government
speech more generally. In so doing, it explores when, if ever, governmental
campaign speech is sufficiently dangerous to justify a departure from the
general rule that the government’s own speech is insulated from Free Speech
Clause review.16
To this end, Part I describes the spectrum of governmental campaign
speech on pending ballot and legislative measures that critics have identified as
potentially troubling. In so doing, it identifies two major strands of argument
that appear in the various critiques of the government’s speech on issue
campaigns. One strand involves a disagreement about the appropriate
expressive role of government specifically, while the other involves a
disagreement about the effects of campaign speech by powerful parties more
generally. These disputes valuably force us to think about how government
does, and should, work—as well as how speech does, and should, work.
Part II responds to those critiques. In so doing, it reviews and renews this
debate through the lens of the Court’s emerging government speech doctrine,
as well as its campaign finance reform jurisprudence. It concludes that
transparently governmental campaign speech on certain contested political
issues—campaign speech on pending ballot or legislative measures that is
clearly identified to the public as governmental in source—furthers, rather than
frustrates, key First Amendment values and thus should not trigger any unique
constitutional suspicion. More specifically, such expression enhances political
accountability by informing voters of their government’s priorities and
preferences, provides a valuable heuristic for those who do not have the time
or expertise to evaluate competing policy arguments for themselves, and adds
to the marketplace of available ideas and arguments, especially (but not
exclusively) as a counter to less accountable and nontransparent expression
from powerful, private sources. Indeed, government expression’s value in this
15

Kidwell v. City of Union, 462 F.3d 620, 621–22, 626 (6th Cir. 2006).
I am indebted to Joseph Blocher for his observation that this is an analysis of the possibility of an
exception to an exception: whether government campaign speech should be excepted (by subjecting it to Free
Speech Clause scrutiny) from government speech doctrine more generally, which itself is an exception to
traditional First Amendment doctrine (by exempting the government’s own expression from Free Speech
Clause scrutiny).
16
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context may be particularly heightened in light of the current Supreme Court’s
unwillingness in Citizens United v. FEC to permit limitations on campaign
speech by corporate and other powerful, private interests.17
Part III considers possible limits to this Article’s proposition that
government speech on issue campaigns generally furthers key constitutional
values and thus should not be understood to run afoul of the First Amendment.
First, it emphasizes that government’s campaign speech on contested ballot or
legislative measures should be considered consistent with the Free Speech
Clause only when that speech is transparently governmental in origin—when
the public can clearly identify the message’s governmental origins and thus
hold the government politically accountable for its views. Second, it
distinguishes government campaign speech regarding candidates, concluding
that government entities’ speech endorsing or opposing specific candidates
raises potentially greater threats to First Amendment interests in constraining
the self-perpetuation of incumbents and the entrenchment of political power.
Finally, it discusses the availability of statutory and other nonconstitutional
limits on government speech on issue campaigns, concluding that those
constraints are constitutionally permissible yet often unwise as a policy matter
in light of government expression’s great instrumental value to the public. It
urges instead that policymakers carefully target such constraints to address
specific instances of abusive government speech.
I. THE PERCEIVED CONSTITUTIONAL DANGERS OF GOVERNMENTAL
CAMPAIGN SPEECH
This Part briefly describes the concerns raised in longstanding debates over
the dangers—or lack thereof—of government’s expressive participation in
contested issue campaigns.18 Examples include those over state and local
governments’ advocacy in support of or opposition to ballot measures to be
voted on directly by the citizenry, as well as government entities’ advocacy in
support of or opposition to measures to be voted on by a legislature.

17

130 S. Ct. 876, 913 (2010).
As discussed in greater detail in Part III, this Article distinguishes government speech expressing a
position on contested issue campaigns from government entities’ speech endorsing or opposing a specific
candidate or party.
18

NORTON GALLEYSFINAL2.DOCX

2011]

4/10/2012 7:18 AM

CAMPAIGN SPEECH LAW WITH A TWIST

217

A. Debates over Government Speech on Contested Ballot Measures
Federal and state courts have long displayed deep suspicion of the
government’s issue-related campaign expression. As discussed in detail below,
for years they routinely upheld plaintiffs’ challenges to the government’s
political advocacy in support of or opposition to pending ballot measures.
Moreover, several of the opinions in the Supreme Court’s most recent
discussion of government speech assumed, without citation or explanation, the
existence of limitations on the government’s power to engage in certain
political or partisan advocacy.19
Note, however, that these courts did not consistently identify a clear legal
source of their discomfort with the government’s campaign speech. While
many grounded their resistance in state and local government law limiting the
powers of state or local governmental bodies,20 others pointed to the Free
Speech Clause and the Guarantee Clause, as well as other unidentified
constitutional sources. For example, the California Supreme Court has
suggested that public agencies’ expenditures to advocate for or against pending
ballot measures “raise potentially serious constitutional questions.”21 More
unequivocally, a Colorado federal court steeped its constitutional rejection of a
school board’s power to expend funds to communicate with voters regarding a

19 See Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, 129 S. Ct. 1125, 1131–32 (2009) (“This does not mean that there
are no restraints on government speech. . . . The involvement of public officials in advocacy may be limited by
law, regulation, or practice.”); id. at 1139 (Stevens, J., concurring) (“Finally, recognizing permanent displays
on public property as government speech will not give the government free license to communicate offensive
or partisan messages. For even if the Free Speech Clause neither restricts nor protects government speech,
government speakers are bound by the Constitution’s other proscriptions, including those supplied by the
Establishment and Equal Protection Clauses. Together with the checks imposed by our democratic processes,
these constitutional safeguards ensure that the effect of today’s decision will be limited.”).
20 See, e.g., Rees v. Carlisle, 153 P.3d 1131, 1137–39 (Haw. 2007) (concluding that a prosecutor’s use of
public resources to urge voters to support an amendment to Hawaii’s constitution violates state law interpreted
to permit a prosecutor to offer comments but not to engage in express advocacy); Citizens to Protect Pub.
Funds v. Bd. of Educ., 98 A.2d 673, 676–77 (N.J. 1953) (determining that a school board’s use of public funds
to print a booklet urging voters to “Vote Yes” on a bond referendum was not within the power implied to the
board by its express power to operate the schools); Porter v. Tiffany, 502 P.2d 1385 (Or. Ct. App. 1972)
(finding no statutory authorization for a city water and electric board’s expenditure of funds for materials
advocating support of election measures regarding nuclear power program participation and delay of
construction of a nuclear power plant).
21 Stanson v. Mott, 551 P.2d 1, 9 (Cal. 1976) (in bank); accord Vargas v. City of Salinas, 205 P.3d 207,
226 (Cal. 2009) (discussing potential constitutional problems that may arise from the government’s use of
public funds for speech in support of issue campaigns).
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pending ballot measure in First Amendment rights to free speech and
petition,22 as well as in Guarantee Clause concerns.23
Regardless of the specific constitutional source of their discomfort with
governmental campaign speech, critics generally voice one or both of two
objections. Some urge that the government should refrain from seeking to
persuade the public on such matters because its governmental status means that
its voice will inevitably coerce listeners’ beliefs. Others also (or instead) argue
that the government’s voice threatens to drown out or otherwise unfairly
disadvantage dissenting speakers. The following examples illustrate these
courts’ concerns in more detail.
Among the earliest24—and subsequently most influential—objections to the
government’s campaign speech on contested ballot measures was that by
Justice-to-be William Brennan when he served on the New Jersey Supreme

22

See Mountain States Legal Found. v. Denver Sch. Dist. # 1, 459 F. Supp. 357, 360 (D. Colo. 1978)
(“[A] grant of express authority for a partisan use of public funds in an election of this type would violate the
First Amendment to the United States Constitution . . . .”).
23 See id. at 361 (“When residents within a state seek to participate in this process by proposing an
amendment to the state constitution, the expenditure of public funds in opposition to that effort violates a basic
precept of this nation’s democratic process. Indeed, it would seem so contrary to the root philosophy of a
republican form of government as might cause this Court to resort to [Article IV’s] guaranty clause . . . .”).
Article IV, Section 4 of the Constitution—commonly known as the Guarantee Clause—provides that “[t]he
United States shall guarantee to every State in this Union a Republican Form of Government.” U.S. CONST.
art. IV, § 4. Although the Supreme Court has long held that Guarantee Clause claims are not justiciable, e.g.,
Luther v. Borden, 48 U.S. (7 How.) 1, 42–43 (1849), a number of judges reviewing challenges to government
campaign speech on contested ballot measures have suggested that this holding should be revisited, see, e.g.,
Kidwell v. City of Union, 462 F.3d 620, 635–36 & n.5 (6th Cir. 2006) (Martin, J., dissenting) (noting that,
because “ordinary democratic controls are insufficient as a remedy in situations where governmental influence
threatens to undermine the independent political process” and “[g]overnmental advocacy and campaign
expenditures could arguably threaten to undermine free and fair elections, could be coercive, and could
reasonably undermine the reliability and outcome of elections where the government acts as a participant,”
“[p]erhaps it is time for the Supreme Court to reconsider its Guarantee Clause jurisprudence”).
24 For other early examples of this trend, see Mines v. Del Valle, 257 P. 530, 536–37 (Cal. 1927) (in
bank) (holding that the express municipal power to operate a public utility did not imply the power to
appropriate funding to urge voters to approve a bond referendum to extend the utility), overruled by Stanson,
551 P.2d 1; and Elsenau v. City of Chicago, 165 N.E. 129, 131 (Ill. 1929) (invalidating as an unauthorized
municipal function a city’s expenditures for advertisements that “did not purport to be an impartial statement
of facts for the information of the voters, but that . . . was an attempt, partisan in its nature, to induce the voters
to act favorably upon the bond issues submitted at the election”). Some early courts bucked this trend,
emphasizing the instrumental value of the government’s expression on ballot campaigns. E.g., City Affairs
Comm. v. Bd. of Comm’rs, 41 A.2d 798, 800 (N.J. Sup. Ct. 1945) (“We think municipalities may, within their
discretion and in good faith, present their views for or against proposed legislation or referendum to the people
of questions which in their judgment would adversely affect the interests of their residents.”), aff’d, 46 A.2d
425 (N.J. 1946).
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Court.25 A school board had appropriated a few hundred dollars in public funds
for the printing and dissemination of an eighteen-page booklet that urged
voters to support a bond referendum that would finance the expansion of
several school buildings—an expansion, the board maintained, necessary to
ensure adequate educational facilities for the town’s children.26 In dictum27 that
proved persuasive to many later courts, Brennan characterized the
government’s advocacy as fundamentally unfair to those with different views:
[T]he board made use of public funds to advocate one side only of
the controversial question without affording the dissenters the
opportunity by means of that financed medium to present their side,
and thus imperilled the propriety of the entire expenditure. The
public funds entrusted to the board belong equally to the proponents
and opponents of the proposition, and the use of the funds to finance
not the presentation of facts merely but also arguments to persuade
the voters that only one side has merit, gives the dissenters just cause
for complaint. The expenditure is then not within the implied power
and is not lawful in the absence of express authority from the
Legislature. . . .
....
. . . We are persuaded, however, that simple fairness and justice
to the rights of dissenters require that the use by public bodies of
public funds for advocacy be restrained within those limits in the
28
absence of a legislative grant in express terms of the broader power.

Many other courts thereafter similarly characterized the government’s
participation in such debates as fundamentally unfair to dissenters.29 A Florida
state court offered a typical analysis when upholding a challenge to a county’s

25

Citizens to Protect Pub. Funds, 98 A.2d 673.
Id. at 674.
27 The court determined the issue to be moot because the election had already occurred. Id. at 676
(dictum) (“Plainly, then, any issues as to both the booklet and the radio broadcast are moot . . . . Nevertheless,
the importance of the question makes appropriate our comment upon the actions taken.”).
28 Id. at 677–78 (dictum).
29 See, e.g., Palm Beach Cnty. v. Hudspeth, 540 So. 2d 147, 154 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1989) (“If
government, with its relatively vast financial resources, access to the media and technical know-how,
undertakes a campaign to favor or oppose a measure placed on the ballot, then by so doing government
undercuts the very fabric which the constitution weaves to prevent government from stifling the voice of the
people.”); Anderson v. City of Boston, 380 N.E.2d 628, 639 (Mass. 1978) (“Fairness and the appearance of
fairness are assured by a prohibition against using public tax revenues to advocate a position which certain
taxpayers oppose.”); Stern v. Kramarsky, 375 N.Y.S.2d 235, 237 (Sup. Ct. Spec. Term 1975) (“It should be
noted that by lending their support to the campaign underway for the passage of the Equal Rights Amendment,
defendants not only provide certain promotional and advertising assistance, but they endow that campaign with
all of the prestige and influence naturally arising from any endorsement of a governmental authority.”).
26
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expenditure of funds to promote passage of a referendum that would have
created a unified county health care district:
It is never in the public interest . . . to pick up the gauntlet and enter
the fray. The funds collected from taxpayers theoretically belong to
proponents and opponents of county action alike. To favor one side
of any such issue by expending funds obtained from those who do
not favor that issue turns government on its head and is the antithesis
of the democratic process.
. . . The appropriate function of government in connection with
an issue placed before the electorate is to enlighten, NOT to
30
proselytize.

Most of these cases involved challenges to the government’s advocacy with
respect to pending initiatives and referenda involving the financing of public
schools31 and other government services.32 But government entities’ advocacy
in support of ratification of the Equal Rights Amendment (ERA) triggered
similar challenges and similar results. A New York state court, for example,
expressed related objections when enjoining the state human rights agency
from preparing flyers, pamphlets, and broadcast ads in support of a referendum
to amend the state constitution to include the ERA.33 In so doing, the court
suggested that such advocacy smacked of totalitarianism:
As a State agency supported by public funds they cannot advocate
their favored position on any issue or for any candidates, as such. So

30

Hudspeth, 540 So. 2d at 154.
See, e.g., Campbell v. Joint Dist. 28-J, 704 F.2d 501 (10th Cir. 1983) (concluding that a school
district’s expenditures urging the approval of a financing proposal were unauthorized under state statute);
Choice-in-Educ. League v. L.A. Unified Sch. Dist., 21 Cal. Rptr. 2d 303 (Ct. App. 1993) (reversing the trial
court’s grant of a preliminary injunction enjoining school board members from expressing opposition to a
pending voucher proposal); Coffman v. Colo. Common Cause, 102 P.3d 999 (Colo. 2004) (en banc)
(concluding that the secretary of state’s press releases opposing a statewide ballot initiative concerning school
funding violated a state statute prohibiting public agencies from using more than fifty dollars in public monies
to support or oppose ballot measures).
32 See, e.g., Stanson v. Mott, 551 P.2d 1 (Cal. 1976) (in bank) (considering a challenge to a state agency’s
expenditures to urge support for increased parks funding); Ameritel Inns, Inc. v. Greater Boise Auditorium
Dist., 119 P.3d 624 (Idaho 2005) (concluding that a local government entity did not have statutory
authorization to use public funds to support a ballot measure to approve the issuance of bonds to fund
construction of the district’s convention center); Carter v. City of Las Cruces, 915 P.2d 336 (N.M. Ct. App.
1996) (considering a taxpayer’s challenge to city officials’ expenditures of public funds to support a ballot
measure to empower the city to acquire a private electric utility).
33 Stern, 375 N.Y.S.2d at 239–40. For other examples of challenges to government speech that took sides
on ballot measures outside of the government-financing context, see Rees v. Carlisle, 153 P.3d 1131, 1141
(Haw. 2007); and King County Council v. Public Disclosure Commission, 611 P.2d 1227 (Wash. 1980) (en
banc).
31
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long as they are an arm of the state government they must maintain a
position of neutrality and impartiality.
It would be establishing a dangerous and untenable precedent to
permit the government or any agency thereof, to use public funds to
disseminate propaganda in favor of or against any issue or candidate.
This may be done by totalitarian, dictatorial or autocratic
governments but cannot be tolerated, directly or indirectly, in these
democratic United States of America. This is true even if the position
34
advocated is believed to be in the best interests of our country.

To be sure, most of these challenges focused on government agencies’
expenditures of public funds for expressive purposes, arguing that such
publicly financed government speech unfairly disadvantaged dissenters in light
of the government’s potentially greater resources, prestige, and power.35 These
concerns foreshadow and parallel (without ever acknowledging) similar
concerns about the dangers posed by unfettered campaign spending by wellfinanced or otherwise-powerful, private parties.
But some critics object to any governmental expression in contested issue
campaigns that deviates from neutrality, regardless of whether the
government’s expression involves the use of public monies. Examples include
challenges to school board members’ remarks in opposition to a pending
school voucher initiative36 and county council members’ vote to endorse an
antipornography measure.37 Critics of such speech view the government’s
sovereign role to require that it entirely refrain from taking sides in such
debates because of the possibility that listeners might otherwise be particularly

34

Stern, 375 N.Y.S.2d at 239.
See, e.g., Stanson, 551 P.2d at 9 (“A fundamental precept of this nation’s democratic electoral process
is that the government may not ‘take sides’ in election contests or bestow an unfair advantage on one of
several competing factions. A principal danger feared by our country’s founders lay in the possibility that the
holders of governmental authority would use official power improperly to perpetuate themselves, or their
allies, in office; the selective use of public funds in election campaigns, of course, raises the specter of just
such an improper distortion of the democratic electoral process.” (citations omitted)).
36 Choice-in-Educ. League, 21 Cal. Rptr. 2d 303. Indeed, governments frequently express themselves on
contested issues through resolutions and proclamations that require little, if anything, in the way of public
expenditures. See Jacob E. Gersen & Eric A. Posner, Soft Law: Lessons from Congressional Practice, 61
STAN. L. REV. 573, 584–86 (2008) (discussing congressional use of resolutions and other hortatory means to
make declarations of policy).
37 King Cnty. Council, 611 P.2d at 1231. See generally Bruce W. Blakely, Comment, Public Utility Bill
Inserts, Political Speech, and the First Amendment: A Constitutionally Mandated Right to Reply, 70 CALIF. L.
REV. 1221, 1254 (1982) (“[I]t is the proper role of government to engage in informational speech. The state,
however, may not employ a forum to engage in partisan expression. Government should not seek to influence
initiatives or campaigns; nor are government editorials acceptable.”).
35
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vulnerable to coercion.38 These critics object to the government’s campaign
speech on any ballot measure that would be decided by the voters themselves,
adopting the view that institutions of representative democracy should express
no opinion on matters to be decided through direct democracy measures like
ballot referenda or initiatives.39 Others modify this posture a bit, remaining
sanguine about government entities’ advocacy in support of referenda they
propose themselves, but objecting to such entities’ expressive opposition to
ballot initiatives proposed by private citizens.40
Some scholars have asserted parallel, and extremely broad, constitutional
objections to the government’s departure from neutrality in contested policy
debates. Robert Kamenshine, for example, proposed that courts should read the
First Amendment to require “an implied prohibition against political
establishment,” arguing that “participation by the government in the
dissemination of political ideas poses a threat to open public debate that is
distinct from government impairment of individual expression.”41 Professor
Kamenshine downplayed the instrumental value—and highlighted the
dangers—of the government’s policy advocacy in almost any context:
Some may argue that the government has a compelling interest
in stimulating support for its programs. The argument is that in order
to operate effectively, the government must be able to advocate the
38

See Stanson, 551 P.2d at 9–10.
See id. (“[W]hile public agency ‘lobbying’ efforts undeniably involve the use of public funds to
promote causes which some members of the public may not support, one of the primary functions of elected
and appointed executive officials is, of course, to devise legislative proposals to attempt to implement the
current administration’s policies. Since the legislative process contemplates that interested parties will attend
legislative hearings to explain the potential benefits or detriments of proposed legislation, public agency
lobbying, within the limits authorized by statute, in no way undermines or distorts the legislative process. By
contrast, the use of the public treasury to mount an election campaign which attempts to influence the
resolution of issues which our Constitution leave to the ‘free election’ of the people does present a serious
threat to the integrity of the electoral process.” (citations omitted)); Note, The Constitutionality of Municipal
Advocacy in Statewide Referendum Campaigns, 93 HARV. L. REV. 535, 556–57 (1980) (“Cities are usually
free to lobby before the legislature to prevent a measure from being put before the statewide electorate in
referendum form. But once the state legislature decides to entrust the final legislative decision to the popular
electorate, it explicitly removes the decision from the hands of state or municipal officeholders. Permitting
those officials to use public funds to attempt to influence the outcome of that decision would partially return
them to a role from which they have been excluded by constitutional design. Municipal governments should
thus refrain from establishing an official political viewpoint during the time that the popular electorate, rather
than its elected representatives, makes law.” (footnotes omitted)).
40 See, e.g., Ala. Libertarian Party v. City of Birmingham, 694 F. Supp. 814, 818 (N.D. Ala. 1988)
(“While defendants might be forbidden to spend funds to support candidates, oppose initiative proposals, etc.,
they are not forbidden to publicize and seek public support for their own governmental proposals.”).
41 Robert D. Kamenshine, The First Amendment’s Implied Political Establishment Clause, 67 CALIF. L.
REV. 1104, 1104 (1979).
39
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merits of its policies and programs. Institutional dissemination of this
sort, however, conflicts with the goal of an open marketplace of
ideas; it distorts public debate and thus raises serious establishment
42
concerns.

Edward Ziegler similarly viewed the government’s expressive participation in
contested policy debates as so unavoidably coercive as to threaten democratic
functions:
[A] characteristic distinguishing democratic from totalitarian
government is that while a democracy attempts to facilitate and
ascertain public opinion and establish policy in accordance therewith,
an autocracy attempts to engineer public opinion in support of its
decisions. . . . It is a truism that, if a governing structure based upon
widespread genuine citizen opinions is to survive as a viable
democracy, it must place legal restraints on the government’s ability
to manipulate the formulation and expression of that opinion.
. . . Although more subtle than censorship, official partisanship
thorough [sic] the affirmative act of disseminating propaganda in
support of a partisan viewpoint may pose as great or greater danger
43
to political rights of free expression.

As an example of such objectionable partisanship, Professor Ziegler pointed to
governmental efforts to urge support for ratification of the ERA.44
In proposing to constrain government expression in an enormously wide
range of settings, Professors Kamenshine and Ziegler staked out one of the far
poles in the spectrum of views about the breadth of the government’s
appropriate expressive function.45 Indeed, much of this debate can be traced to
42 Id. at 1116; accord id. at 1129, 1137 (“Under the prohibition of an implied political establishment
clause, regulations that permit the dissemination of information to improve an agency’s image or to enhance
support for its policies would be impermissible—both as to purpose and effect. . . . The political establishment
clause would require balanced curricular and textbook treatment of the various viewpoints on race relations
and women’s rights. It is possible that in some instances the government would design its textbooks and
curriculum to present only a positive image of a particular group. Courts would have to prohibit such efforts,
however, as a political establishment.” (footnote omitted)).
43 Edward H. Ziegler, Jr., Government Speech and the Constitution: The Limits of Official Partisanship,
21 B.C. L. REV. 578, 579–80 (1980) (footnote omitted). Professor Ziegler defined prohibited “official
partisanship” for these purposes very broadly to include government speech on pending referenda,
constitutional amendments, and legislative proposals. See id. at 581 n.12.
44 Id. at 583.
45 Indeed, the views of Professors Kamenshine and Ziegler may reflect not only a more limited view of
government’s appropriate expressive functions but also an assumption that the coercive effect of the
government’s voice is especially great because people generally trust and defer to their government. That
assumption may be less valid today in light of evidence that voters are significantly more suspicious of the
government than they once were. See, e.g., Margaret Levi & Laura Stoker, Political Trust and
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longstanding, and continuing, battles over what it is that the government
should do. As Steven D. Smith has observed:
What a government can properly say depends on the defined proper
and essential role or function of the government. And issues of
government speech are difficult—intractable, maybe—because there
is no agreement about what government’s purpose and function is or
is not. In this respect, controversies about government speech are
merely symptoms of a deeper disagreement about the proper domain
46
and role of government.

By no means, however, have these debates been entirely one-sided, as other
courts and commentators have demonstrated considerably greater comfort with
the government’s campaign speech in at least some contexts. For example,
Justice Brennan himself later embraced the value of the government’s
campaign speech when he sat on the United States Supreme Court.47 There—
years after repudiating the government’s persuasive efforts in support of
contested ballot measures48—he stayed a state court’s order that had enjoined
the City of Boston from spending public funds to urge support of a ballot
referendum on residential and commercial property tax rates.49 This change of
heart emerged shortly after the Supreme Court’s ruling in First National Bank
of Boston v. Bellotti, which struck down, on First Amendment grounds,
Massachusetts’s campaign finance law that had limited corporate campaign
expenditures on pending ballot measures50—a ruling that newly empowered
corporate participation in this debate and thus triggered Boston’s efforts to
rebut such corporate speech. In determining that “the balance of the equities”
justified a stay,51 Justice Brennan was among the first (and few) to see the link
between government speech and campaign finance debates. He thus
emphasized the value of the government’s voice in informing the voters on
contested ballot measures—especially in countering powerful private speech:
In light of Bellotti, corporate industrial and commercial opponents of
the referendum are free to finance their opposition. On the other
hand, unless the stay is granted, the city is forever denied any
Trustworthiness, 3 ANN. REV. POL. SCI. 475, 476–85 (2000) (surveying social science literature documenting
declines in political trust).
46 Steven D. Smith, Why Is Government Speech Problematic? The Unnecessary Problem, the Unnoticed
Problem, and the Big Problem, 87 DENV. U. L. REV. 945, 968 (2010).
47 City of Boston v. Anderson, 439 U.S. 1389 (Brennan, Circuit Justice 1978).
48 See supra notes 25–28 and accompanying text.
49 Anderson, 439 U.S. 1389.
50 435 U.S. 765 (1978).
51 Anderson, 439 U.S. at 1390.
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opportunity to finance communication to the statewide electorate of
its views in support of the referendum as required in the interests of
52
all taxpayers, including residential property owners.

Still more controversies involving the ERA further illustrate competing
views among the courts of the comparative costs and benefits of the
government’s expressive participation in issue campaigns. Emphasizing the
value as well as the inevitability of the government’s expressive participation
in contested political debates, a California appellate court rejected a First
Amendment challenge to a state women’s commission’s promotion of the
ERA—and, indeed, rejected the possibility of the government’s expressive
neutrality:
The root problem with plaintiffs’ free speech contention is that it
proves too much. They offer no point of distinction between
government speech addressing the status of women and government
speech on any other topic; save that they deem the topic of women’s
status “controversial.” But, controversial or not, it is too late in the
day to contend the economic and social status of women is not a
legitimate topic of governmental concern. If the government, i.e., the
Governor and legislative leaders, cannot appoint a commission to
speak on the topic without implicating plaintiffs’ First Amendment
rights it may not address any other “controversial” topics. If the
53
government cannot address controversial topics it cannot govern.

Other courts similarly upheld the expenditure of public funds for expressive
purposes as central to the government’s role and found no constitutional barrier
to the expression of views by institutions of representative democracy on
matters to be decided by the voters themselves through direct democracy.54
Indeed, illustrating a considerably more expansive view of the government’s
appropriate functions, at least one court directly refuted a presumption of
neutrality by characterizing the government as having a duty to share its views
on such measures with the public: “The City and its officials not only have the
right, but the duty, to determine the needs of its citizens and to provide funds to
52

Id.
Miller v. Cal. Comm’n on the Status of Women, 198 Cal. Rptr. 877, 882 (Ct. App. 1984) (footnote
omitted).
54 See, e.g., City Affairs Comm. v. Bd. of Comm’rs, 41 A.2d 798, 800 (N.J. Sup. Ct. 1945) (“We think
municipalities may, within their discretion and in good faith, present their views for or against proposed
legislation or referendum to the people of questions which in their judgment would adversely affect the
interests of their residents. To accomplish this purpose we think they may incur expenditures by the
publication of pamphlets, circulars, newspaper advertisements or radio addresses and that to do so is a proper
governmental function.”), aff’d, 46 A.2d 245 (N.J. 1946).
53
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service those needs.” The same court expressed “a serious doubt as to whether
governmental entities should be required to stand silently by while
propositions which can impact on their tax structures, funds, services and
programs are voted upon, even if initiated by others; unless participation is
statutorily forbidden by an appropriate authority.”55
The majority opinion in Kidwell v. City of Union offers a recent example of
this view—and is one of the first (and few) decisions to tie that view to the
Supreme Court’s emerging government speech doctrine.56 There, a divided
Sixth Circuit rejected a First Amendment challenge to a city’s expenditures of
public funds to express its views on various initiatives related to the
restructuring and funding of the town’s fire department: “To hold that [the
city’s] advocacy converts its treasury to a public forum would severely limit
the town’s ability to self-regulate and would be tantamount to a heckler’s veto,
where the government could not speak for fear of opening its treasury to the
public.”57 Demonstrating that the constitutional debate over the government’s
campaign speech remains live, however, dissenting Judge Martin strongly
objected to the government’s expressive participation in any ballot measure as
unconstitutionally straying from a governmental duty of expressive neutrality:
“I believe that the Constitution properly prohibits the government from having
a horse in the race when it comes to elections. When government advocates on
one side of an issue, the ultimate source of governing power is shifted away
from the people and the threat of official doctrine exists.”58
B. Debates over Government Speech on Contested Legislative Matters
As discussed above, most of the controversy to date has focused on
challenges to public entities’ advocacy in support of or opposition to pending
ballot measures to be decided by the voters themselves. But not all. Some
critics of government speech also object to government entities’ speech to the
public (as opposed to other government officials59) about issues to be decided
55 Ala. Libertarian Party v. City of Birmingham, 694 F. Supp. 814, 817, 819 n.10 (N.D. Ala. 1988);
accord Steven Shiffrin, Government Speech, 27 UCLA L. REV. 565, 613 (1980) (“[I]t is arguably the function,
and perhaps the duty, of public officials to speak out on all issues of the day . . . . Governments, then, can
justify subsidizing the speech of public officials, not to reelect them or others, but because there is a substantial
interest in hearing what they have to say.”).
56 462 F.3d 620 (6th Cir. 2006).
57 Id. at 624.
58 Id. at 635 (Martin, J., dissenting).
59 See, e.g., Stanson v. Mott, 551 P.2d 1, 9 (Cal. 1976) (in bank) (noting that executive officials
necessarily create legislative proposals to advance an administration’s policies).
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by the legislature60—again citing concerns about the appropriate role of
government and about coercion and unfairness to those with different views.61
The First Circuit, for example, expressed its 1973 rejection of the
government’s power to take sides in a contested policy debate in constitutional
terms, upholding a First Amendment challenge to the Boston School Board’s
decision to send notices to all Boston parents urging them to join a march and
rally in opposition to pending busing legislation.62 More recently, the Fourth
Circuit considered a constitutional challenge to a local school board’s
advocacy of a proposed school voucher bill pending before the state
legislature.63 Among other things, the plaintiff there objected to the school
board’s voter-directed speech on pending legislation, arguing for First
Amendment limits on a government body’s advocacy to voters—rather than to
legislators—on a matter to be decided by the state legislature.64 The Fourth
Circuit rejected his constitutional claim.65
Congress has similarly debated the propriety of executive branch officials’
and agencies’ advocacy to the public on matters to be decided by the national
Legislature. Although those critics generally root the constitutional source of
their discomfort in separation-of-powers terms rather than in the First
Amendment,66 the debates in great part parallel those over the government’s
speech on contested ballot measures. In both, controversy swirls not only over
the appropriate role of government—and when, if ever, that role demands
neutrality or silence—but also over whether and when government speech
poses dangers of coercion and unfairness.67
60 For a discussion of how voters considering ballot measures should be viewed as akin to legislators
considering legislative measures, see Doe v. Reed, 130 S. Ct. 2811, 2833 (2010) (Scalia, J., concurring in the
judgment).
61 As explained supra note 10, this Article’s definition of “governmental campaign speech” includes
government entities’ speech on legislative campaigns as well as ballot campaigns because some critics suggest
that the government’s persuasive efforts with respect to matters subject to vote by legislators pose
constitutional threats very similar to the threats they perceive posed by the government’s speech on matters
subject to vote directly by the people themselves.
62 Bonner-Lyons v. Sch. Comm., 480 F.2d 442 (1st Cir. 1973).
63 Page v. Lexington Cnty. Sch. Dist. One, 531 F.3d 275 (4th Cir. 2008).
64 Id. at 287.
65 Id. at 288.
66 See infra notes 80–82 and accompanying text.
67 This too is by no means a new debate over the scope of the government’s appropriate expressive role.
Indeed, Jeffrey Tulis has exhaustively examined historical shifts in views about whether and when the
President should speak directly to the public (rather than only to Congress) in support of or opposition to
pending legislative matters. JEFFREY K. TULIS, THE RHETORICAL PRESIDENCY (1987). After documenting the
rarity with which eighteenth- and nineteenth-century presidents spoke directly to the people on policy matters,
id. at 61–87, Professor Tulis then describes the presidencies of Theodore Roosevelt and Woodrow Wilson as
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Indeed, congressional debates over efforts to regulate the government’s
persuasive speech—termed by some as “propaganda”—in certain political
contexts further illuminate the views of both critics and champions of such
government campaign speech. Along these lines, David W. Guth has carefully
documented longstanding controversies over the meaning and dangers of
government “propaganda” that remain largely unresolved.68 One oftenarticulated, but very broad, view characterizes government “propaganda” as
any effort by the government to persuade its public listeners.69 Others instead
characterize only the government’s covert,70 misleading,71 or monopolistic72
persuasive efforts as “propaganda.” More specifically, Garth Jowett and
Victoria O’Donnell describe distinctions between what some call “white
propaganda” (transparent and accurate persuasive communications by
government); “black propaganda” (deceptive and nontransparent governmental
efforts to persuade); and “gray propaganda” (where the source and accuracy of
the communications remain unclear).73 Once again, these competing
definitions of “propaganda” reveal differing levels of discomfort with
government’s expressive participation in certain political contests.
developing appeals to popular rhetoric as “a principal tool of presidential governance” for the first time, id. at
4. Of course, presidents now regularly appeal directly to the people at large, rather than to Congress, in
soliciting support for legislative and other policy initiatives. I thank Jonathan Estin for directing me to this
very helpful resource.
68 See David W. Guth, Black, White, and Shades of Gray: The Sixty-Year Debate over Propaganda
Versus Public Diplomacy, 14 J. PROMOTION MGMT. 309 (2008).
69 See id. at 310 (noting that many use the term propaganda “as an umbrella covering all forms of
persuasive communication, including advertising and public relations”). Although my focus here is on
controversies over the government’s domestic “propaganda,” such definitional challenges play out in the
international arena as well. See, e.g., Richard B. Collins, Propaganda for War and Transparency, 87 DENV. U.
L. REV. 819, 821–28 (2010) (discussing varying definitions of “war propaganda” prohibited by international
law and prosecuted in the Tokyo and Nuremberg war crimes trials).
70 See Guth, supra note 68, at 310 (noting that some distinguish between “revealed propaganda,
messages that are overt in their effort to persuade, such as those in conventional advertising,” and “concealed
propaganda, such as publicity generated from the distribution of news releases”).
71 E.g., Kelly Sarabyn, Prescribing Orthodoxy, 8 CARDOZO PUB. L. POL’Y & ETHICS J. 367, 369 (2010).
72 See Frederick Schauer, Is Government Speech a Problem?, 35 STAN. L. REV. 373, 380 (1983)
(reviewing MARK G. YUDOF, WHEN GOVERNMENT SPEAKS: POLITICS, LAW, AND GOVERNMENT EXPRESSION
IN AMERICA (1983)) (“Now it is true that propaganda is hardly a term of precise definition, but we usually use
it when talking about totalitarian regimes whose propaganda is coupled with a rigid, if not absolute,
suppression of any voice other than that of the state. The issues raised when the state is the only voice are
significantly different from those raised when the state is one of many voices, especially when the other voices
are unrestrained both in law and in fact.”).
73 GARTH S. JOWETT & VICTORIA O’DONNELL, PROPAGANDA & PERSUASION 17–20 (5th ed. 2012).
Objections to government’s “propaganda,” however defined, may turn on the government’s target audience.
For example, Guth describes a 1948 statute that “authorized the federal government to engage in a program of
dissemination of truthful information to international audiences, while . . . prohibit[ing] the government from
transmitting the same information to domestic publics.” Guth, supra note 68, at 312.
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In response to various concerns about the potential dangers of such
expression, Congress has regulated government “propaganda” on a number of
occasions.74 For example, since 1951 each Congress has enacted an
appropriations rider that entirely bars federal agencies from unauthorized
expenditures to engage in “publicity or propaganda.”75 Never, however, has
Congress defined this statutory term.76
This proposal was initially spurred by members of Congress unhappy77
with the Eisenhower Administration’s efforts to generate public support for its
proposed health care legislation.78 In particular, the prohibition’s sponsors
objected strenuously to, and characterized as potentially totalitarian, public
speeches and other materials in support of the Administration’s bill by Oscar
Ewing, the head of the U.S. Federal Security Administration (the federal
74 In 1942, for instance, Congress amended the Foreign Agents Registration Act to require agents of
foreign principals who distribute “political propaganda” to ensure the material’s conspicuous labeling as such.
Pub. L. No. 77-532, sec. 1, § 4(b), 56 Stat. 248, 255 (1942) (amended 1995). In enacting this requirement,
Congress was spurred by concerns about the circulation of anonymous anti-American propaganda from Nazi
sources in the years before and during World War II. See H.R. REP. NO. 75-1381, at 2 (1937) (“This required
registration will publicize the nature of subversive or other similar activities of such foreign propagandists, so
that the American people may know those who are engaged in this country by foreign agencies to spread
doctrines alien to our democratic form of government, or propaganda for the purpose of influencing American
public opinion on a political question. . . . We believe that the spotlight of pitiless publicity will serve as a
deterrent to the spread of pernicious propaganda. We feel that our people are entitled to know the sources of
any such efforts . . . .”). Decades later, a plaintiff who sought to exhibit Canadian films on acid rain and
nuclear war challenged the statute on First Amendment grounds, arguing that the Act’s labeling requirements
with respect to “propaganda” included a pejorative connotation that deterred him from exhibiting the films
under such terms. Meese v. Keene, 481 U.S. 465, 467–68 (1987). After discussing the wide variety of
available definitions of the term “propaganda,” id. at 477–78, the Supreme Court ultimately—and
controversially—concluded that the labeling requirements did not burden speech (and thus posed no First
Amendment problem) because Congress intended no pejorative connotation when using the term in the Act, id.
at 484–85. Congress amended the statute in 1995 to replace the term “political propaganda” with
“informational materials.” Lobbying Disclosure Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-65, sec. 9, § 614(a)–(c), 109
Stat. 691, 700.
75 Jodie Morse, Note, Managing the News: The History and Constitutionality of the Government Spin
Machine, 81 N.Y.U. L. REV. 843, 853 (2006) (quoting 97 CONG. REC. 4098 (1951)).
76 See, e.g., Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-199, 118 Stat. 3.
77 Powerful, private interests like the American Medical Association were unhappy as well. See Harry M.
Marks, Revisiting “The Origins of Compulsory Drug Prescriptions,” 85 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 109, 112–13
(1995) (describing the American Medical Association’s hostility toward Oscar Ewing and his efforts).
78 See, e.g., OSCAR R. EWING, THE NATION’S HEALTH: A REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT 12–13 (1948) (“In
the face of these and the other proofs given in this report that further rapid improvement in national health can
be achieved only by concerted effort, and that the need for increased Federal action is imperative, I have
reached the considered conclusion that more extensive and efficient Nation-wide planning is the only effective
way to accomplish a significant betterment in national health.”); id. at 18 (“I am compelled to urge, as strongly
as I know how, that the Congress enact, as President Truman has recommended, a system of Government
prepayment health insurance in the terms in which it has been mapped out in [the report].”).
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agency that served as the precursor to today’s Department of Health and
Human Services).79 Ewing’s advocacy triggered a debate over the value and
danger of executive branch speech that remains unresolved today.
More specifically, congressional supporters of the propaganda ban objected
to executive branch officials’ advocacy to the public on an issue pending
before the legislative branch as not only potentially coercive of public opinion
but also offensive to the appropriate separation of powers.80 The original
congressional debate over the proposed rider thus centered on whether a
prohibition on undefined propaganda would interfere with the government’s
responsibility to inform the public about its programs,81 or instead would
simply prevent the government from adopting what some characterized as
coercive governance tactics.82 The latter view prevailed, and the propaganda
ban passed without any definition of the prohibited speech. The ban has
remained in place as an appropriations rider for the many decades since its
initial adoption.
Despite this longstanding ban, executive branch agencies and officials, of
course, regularly continue to speak to the public about a wide variety of

79 See Legislative Activities of Executive Agencies: Hearings Before the H. Select Comm. on Lobbying
Activities, 81st Cong. 338–39 (1950) (statements of Charles A. Halleck & Clarence J. Brown, Members, H.
Select Comm. on Lobbying Activities) (disparaging Ewing’s efforts in “sell[ing] that particular piece of
legislation” as “mak[ing] speeches and spread[ing] the philosophy of socialism and Government
dictatorship”).
80 See id. at 341 (statement of Clarence J. Brown, Member, H. Select Comm. on Lobbying Activities)
(“[Y]ou have certain administrative responsibilities, but the Constitution does not give you any authority to
attempt to make law. It restricts that authority to no one else in the world but to the Congress of the United
States. The President does not have any authority to make law, nor should he have. He sometimes tries to
exercise it, however.”).
81 See 97 CONG. REC. 4098 (1951) (statement of Rep. Sidney R. Yates) (“Would not the effect of the
gentleman’s amendment in using the word ‘propaganda’ jeopardize publication by the Children’s Bureau of
pamphlets pertaining to the training and growth of children?”); id. at 4099 (statement of Rep. John E. Fogarty)
(“We do not even know what the gentleman calls propaganda. We do not know what he calls the right type of
publicity or the wrong type of publicity. That is the fault I find with this amendment.”); id. at 4100 (statement
of Rep. John E. Fogarty) (“Here you are limiting the amount of publicity and propaganda which may be issued
by any agency of government in this bill and yet you do not define in the amendment what propaganda is or
what publicity is.”).
82 See id. at 4099 (statement of Rep. George Meader) (“[The propaganda prohibition] is necessary to
strengthen the Congress in the interest of formulating national policy by the people themselves. It is a corollary
to that principle that public opinion ought not to be subjected to influence and direction by the executive
agencies, the administrative branch of the Government, in the manner that it is today. In a democracy, where
public opinion rules in the long run, the media of communication: the press, the radio, television, and the
printed word, are very potent weapons in the control of the affairs of this country.”).
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matters, legislative and otherwise.83 Indeed, the office charged with monitoring
the ban’s enforcement—the Government Accountability Office (GAO)—has
defined the ban narrowly and identified violations very rarely.84 In so doing,
the GAO has emphasized the value of executive branch expression:
Our decisions reflect societal values in favor of a robust exchange of
information between the government and the public it serves. This
includes the right to disseminate information in defense of an
administration’s point of view on policy matters.
Accordingly, as part of our efforts to strike the right balance, we
have historically afforded agencies wide discretion in their
85
informational activities.

More specifically, absent any statutory definition of prohibited government
propaganda, the GAO has interpreted the ban to prohibit only a federal
agency’s “self-aggrandizement” or “puffery” (i.e., materials that “emphasize
the importance of the agency or one of its officials”); federal agency activities
that are “purely partisan in nature” (i.e., that are “designed to aid a political
candidate or party”); and “covert propaganda” (i.e., materials that do not
disclose their governmental source).86 Emphasizing government expression’s
great instrumental value to the public, moreover, the GAO has construed even
83 For discussion of the inevitability of executive speech on such matters, see, e.g., Leslie Gielow Jacobs,
Bush, Obama and Beyond: Observations on the Prospect of Fact Checking Executive Department Threat
Claims Before the Use of Force, 26 CONST. COMMENT. 433 (2010); and Vasan Kesavan & J. Gregory Sidak,
The Legislator-in-Chief, 44 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1 (2002).
84 As the agency charged generally with monitoring public expenditures, the GAO is the administrative
body nominally responsible for attending to the “propaganda rider.” Morse, supra note 75, at 859; accord 1
OFFICE OF THE GEN. COUNSEL, U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, PRINCIPLES OF FEDERAL APPROPRIATIONS
LAW 4-198 (3d ed. 2004). The GAO, however, has only a purely advisory function and no direct enforcement
power. Morse, supra note 75, at 859. At most, the GAO makes findings and can refer its determinations to
Congress or other governmental bodies for further investigation. Id.
85 U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, B-302504, MEDICARE PRESCRIPTION DRUG, IMPROVEMENT, AND
MODERNIZATION ACT OF 2003—USE OF APPROPRIATED FUNDS FOR FLYER AND PRINT AND TELEVISION
ADVERTISEMENTS 7 (2004) (citations omitted). Along these lines, the GAO has declined to characterize the
government’s expressive activities as prohibited “propaganda” as long as they “are reasonably related to the
agency’s duty to inform the public of agency actions, programs, and policies, or justify and rebut attacks upon
its policies.” U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, B-316443, DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE—RETIRED
MILITARY OFFICERS AS MEDIA ANALYSTS 8 (2009); accord U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, supra, at 13 (“To
restrict all materials that have some political content or express support for an Administration’s policies would
significantly curtail the recognized and legitimate exercise of the Administration’s authority to inform the
public of its policies, to justify its policies and to rebut attacks on its policies. It is important for the public to
understand the philosophical underpinnings of the policies advanced by elected officials and their staff in order
for the public to evaluate and form opinions on those policies.”).
86 U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, B-319075, DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES—
USE OF APPROPRIATED FUNDS FOR “HEALTHREFORM.GOV” WEB SITE AND “STATE YOUR SUPPORT” WEB PAGE
7–8 (2010).
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those categories narrowly87 and has been further reluctant to find violations
other than in cases of covert government promotion of its programs or
policies.88
Recent controversies, however, have renewed attention to the propaganda
ban, its definitional deficiencies, and its lack of enforcement. Examples include
the Department of Education’s contract with newspaper columnists to produce
op-eds supporting the Bush Administration’s “No Child Left Behind” initiative
without disclosing the Department’s sponsorship,89 as well as the
Administration’s briefing of and other close involvement with retired military
personnel who then appeared on television as private military analysts offering
their view of the war in Iraq and Afghanistan.90 These developments triggered
new (but so far unsuccessful) congressional efforts not only to define
prohibited government “propaganda” for the first time but also to define it very
broadly.91 Indeed, although the public controversies themselves focused on
allegedly covert governmental speech—persuasive speech sponsored by the
government that did not disclose its governmental origins—congressional
critics responded with the introduction of bills that proposed much more
sweeping restrictions on executive branch speech on legislative matters.92

87 See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 85, at 2 (“Application of the prohibition is
necessarily balanced against an agency’s responsibility to inform the public about its activities and programs,
explain its policies and priorities, and defend its policies, priorities, and point of view.”).
88 See, e.g., U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, B-305368, DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION—CONTRACT
TO OBTAIN SERVICES OF ARMSTRONG WILLIAMS 14 (2005) (“Every agency has a legitimate interest in the
‘dissemination to the general public . . . of information reasonably necessary to the proper administration of
the laws’ for which the agency is responsible. However, while we agree that the Department should
disseminate information to the public on the NCLB Act, it must disclose its role.” (citations omitted) (quoting
U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, B-106139, APPROPRIATIONS—LIMITATIONS—PUBLICITY AND PROPAGANDA
PROHIBITION—LABOR–FEDERAL SECURITY APPROPRIATION ACT, 1952 (1952))).
89 See id. at 1.
90 David Barstow, Behind TV Analysts, Pentagon’s Hidden Hand, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 20, 2008), http://
www.nytimes.com/2008/04/20/us/20generals.html?_r=3&scp=1&sq=hand+of+pentagon&st=nyt&oref=slogin
&oref=slogin. The GAO’s 2009 report found that the program did not violate the propaganda ban. See U.S.
GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 85, at 2 (“Clearly, DOD attempted to favorably influence public
opinion with respect to the Administration’s war policies in Iraq and Afghanistan through the RMOs [Retired
Military Officers]. However, as we discuss below, and based on the record before us in this case, we conclude
that DOD’s public affairs outreach program to RMOs did not violate the prohibition. We found no evidence
that DOD attempted to conceal from the public its outreach to RMOs or its role in providing RMOs with
information, materials, access to department officials, travel, and luncheons. Moreover, we found no evidence
that DOD contracted with or paid RMOs for positive commentary or analysis.”).
91 For example, legislation introduced in the Senate in 2005 would have prohibited, inter alia, any
executive branch expression “designed to support or defeat legislation pending before Congress or any State
legislature” other than testimony at legislative hearings. S. 266, 109th Cong. §§ 3–4 (2005).
92 See, e.g., S. 266.
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This Part has documented longstanding debates over the comparative value
and dangers of the government’s expressive participation in contested policy
debates. The next Part joins this debate.
II. EVALUATING THE POTENTIAL CONSTITUTIONAL DANGERS OF
GOVERNMENTAL CAMPAIGN SPEECH ON CONTESTED POLICY ISSUES
This Part identifies and responds to two major strands of argument that
appear in the various critiques of the government’s campaign speech on
contested ballot and legislative measures. Critics offer both sets of arguments
to support the claim that constitutional values are best protected by silencing
the government’s speech in such contexts.93 I suggest that one strand involves
a disagreement about the appropriate expressive role of the government
specifically, while the other involves a disagreement about the effects of
campaign speech by powerful parties more generally. These disputes valuably
force us to think about how the government does, and should, work—as well
as how speech does, and should, work.
More specifically, the first critique focuses on the government as speaker,
objecting to governmental deviations from neutrality or silence on certain
matters. My response here draws in great part from debates over government
speech more generally (i.e., government speech outside of the campaign
context).
The second critique focuses instead on the effects of campaign speech by
especially powerful speakers, governmental or otherwise. My discussion here
draws in great part from ongoing debates over the effects of speech by private
parties in the campaign context and whether the dangers of such speech or of
its regulation pose the greater threat to First Amendment values. More
specifically, Kathleen Sullivan has helpfully described the debate over the
constitutionality of campaign finance reform as a clash between competing
views of the First Amendment.94 One envisions free speech as “serving the
93 Such a claim—that some speech should be restricted to facilitate free speech values—may seem novel
from a First Amendment standpoint but, of course, is not without some precedent. For example, the debate
over the First Amendment implications of campaign finance regulation in part turns on a debate over whether
the First Amendment protects speech (in which case, government restrictions on corporations’ campaign
speech are suspect) or certain speakers (in which case, corporate campaign speech might be permissibly
regulated to prevent drowning out the speech of protected speakers). See Kathleen M. Sullivan, Two Concepts
of Freedom of Speech, 124 HARV. L. REV. 143, 155, 158 (2010) (discussing implications of the debate over
whether the First Amendment protects speech or speakers).
94 Sullivan, supra note 93.
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interest of political liberty,” treating “with skepticism all government efforts at
speech suppression that might skew the private ordering of ideas. And on this
view, members of the public are trusted to make their own individual
evaluations of speech, and government is forbidden to intervene for
paternalistic or redistributive reasons.”95 The other approach to the First
Amendment envisions free speech rights as “serv[ing] an overarching interest
in political equality,” which primarily embraces an antidiscrimination principle
that protects dissenters and other marginal speakers from disadvantage.96
Under this view, “politically disadvantaged speech prevails over regulation but
regulation promoting political equality prevails over speech.”97
With this as background, we can understand critics of government
campaign speech as variously arguing that such expression offends both liberty
and equality values implicated by the First Amendment’s Free Speech Clause.
First, critics share a concern that the government’s campaign advocacy
threatens a liberty-based conception of the First Amendment because they
perceive it as inherently coercive of listeners’ beliefs due to the government’s
sovereign status.98 Second, even if government persuasion falls short of
actually coercing listeners, critics fear that the government’s voice remains
sufficiently powerful to threaten First Amendment equality interests by
drowning out or otherwise unfairly disadvantaging dissenting speakers.99
After considering each of these critiques, this Part ultimately rejects both,
concluding that the government’s expressive participation in contested issue
campaigns generally furthers, rather than frustrates, key First Amendment
values.100
A. Responding to Critiques of the Government as Speaker
A number of critics object to any persuasive efforts by government
speakers on matters subject to vote by members of the public; some critics also
object to government speech to the public on matters subject to vote by the
95

Id. at 145.
Id. at 144.
97 Id. at 145.
98 See supra notes 33–34 and accompanying text.
99 See supra notes 25–29 and accompanying text.
100 Note that this Article does not maintain that the government has a First Amendment right to speak, but
instead that government speech does not violate the Free Speech Clause because its expression furthers, rather
than frustrates, key First Amendment values. As discussed in more detail below, that the government is not a
First Amendment rights holder itself leaves open the possibility that its speech could be constrained through
statute or other nonconstitutional means. See infra notes 209–12 and accompanying text.
96
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people’s elected representatives. These objections are rooted in a specific
theory of government and its appropriate role, rather than (as discussed
later101) in a theory that speech by powerful parties more generally inflicts
harm in the campaign context.
1. Government Persuasion Can Be Parsed from Government Coercion
Central to this critique is the notion that the government is unique among
all speakers because of its potentially coercive power as sovereign—its power
to apply “sufficient pressure . . . to compel a certain course of action.”102
Recall that the values at the heart of the Free Speech Clause include an interest
in protecting individual liberty from government coercion.103 Liberty-based
arguments usually focus on whether the government is undermining individual
autonomy and self-expression by punishing private speakers for their views.104
Such liberty-based arguments take different form in the context of
governmental campaign speech, however, where critics seek to silence the
government for fear that otherwise the government’s expressive efforts will
coerce listeners’ beliefs and expression. In other words, as described above,
some see the government’s persuasive voice on campaign matters as inherently
and inevitably coercive—potentially even posing threats of totalitarianism.105

101

See infra notes 139–41 and accompanying text.
Ekow N. Yankah, The Force of Law: The Role of Coercion in Legal Norms, 42 U. RICH. L. REV. 1195,
1216 (2008); accord id. at 1199 (“Asserting that the law is coercive isolates a particular way it treats people;
namely, the law imposes a non-voluntary normative system on people.”); id. at 1218 (“Coercion is normally
claimed when one has been forced by another to act, or refrain from acting, against their will. Coercive
pressure can overcome one’s will and make a particular course of action unreasonably costly. For example,
where coercive pressure is applied to Bob, that pressure would render one or more of his options unreasonably
costly. Coercive pressure in this respect makes a particular option unreasonable but not necessarily
impossible.” (footnote omitted)).
103 The First Amendment’s primary purposes are most often identified to include protecting individual
interests in autonomy and self-expression, furthering citizen participation in democratic self-government, and
contributing to the discovery of truth and the development of knowledge. See, e.g., Ronald A. Cass, The Perils
of Positive Thinking: Constitutional Interpretation and Negative First Amendment Theory, 34 UCLA L. REV.
1405, 1411 (1987); Thomas I. Emerson, First Amendment Doctrine and the Burger Court, 68 CALIF. L. REV.
422, 423 (1980).
104 See supra note 7.
105 See supra notes 30–34 and accompanying text; see also Brian C. Castello, Note, The Voice of
Government as an Abridgement of First Amendment Rights of Speakers: Rethinking Meese v. Keene, 1989
DUKE L.J. 654, 676 (“When the public perceives the government as having expert knowledge of an issue or
unrivaled control over a matter, the government communication may command even greater respect and faith.
Respect for the government, reliance on the accuracy of its statements, and fear of challenging its authoritative
word might cause citizens to withdraw, to a certain extent, from their duties of self-governance. As a result,
government would coerce, rather than earn, the majority’s consent.” (footnotes omitted)).
102
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To be sure, governmental efforts at thought control would be anathema to
the First Amendment.106 But just as not all exercises of a sovereign’s power are
coercive, the government’s persuasive expression by itself is not inevitably
manipulative.107 In other words, as Abner Greene has explained, that the
government represents—and, in fact, is—authority does not mean that its
persuasive efforts are necessarily coercive.108
Although he did not address the government’s campaign speech
specifically, Professor Greene has thoughtfully demonstrated that government
speech in general threatens individual liberty only in those rare instances when
it is monopolistic or coercive. He explains coercion as “choice under a kind of
pressure that allows us fairly to say, ‘she did not choose; she was
compelled.’. . . Although there are difficult cases at the margin, we generally
accept the distinction between coercion and persuasion, deeming action
pursuant to persuasion a proper exercise of autonomy.”109 As he observes:
106 See Martin H. Redish & Kevin Finnerty, What Did You Learn in School Today? Free Speech, Values
Inculcation, and the Democratic–Educational Paradox, 88 CORNELL L. REV. 62, 67 (2002) (“[T]he notion of
thought control is inconsistent with the concepts of free thought and mental autonomy that render the exercise
of the free expression right meaningful.”); id. at 75 (“[A] foundational strategy of any sophisticated totalitarian
society is to control the minds of its citizens, thereby destroying individual mental autonomy.”); Sarabyn,
supra note 71, at 369 (“[Prescribing orthodoxy] fails to treat citizens as free and autonomous, and essentially
appoints the state itself as the supreme judge of ideological truth, reproducing its ideological views in the
citizenry by deploying coercion.”).
107 See STEVEN LUKES, POWER: A RADICAL VIEW 21 (2d ed. 2005) (describing power as including
“coercion, influence, authority, force and manipulation,” and distinguishing “coercion,” which means that “A
secures B’s compliance by the threat of deprivation where there is ‘a conflict over values or course of action
between A and B’” from “influence,” which “exists where A, ‘without resorting to either a tacit or an overt
threat of severe deprivation, causes [B] to change his course of action’” (alteration in original) (quoting PETER
BACHRACH & MORTON S. BARATZ, POWER AND POVERTY: THEORY AND PRACTICE 24, 30 (1970))); see also
Schauer, supra note 72, at 384–85 (“If . . . we view the first amendment as primarily or exclusively protecting
individual self-expression, self-realization, self-fulfillment, or something of that sort, then it is hard to see how
government speech could be a first amendment problem. When we focus on communicators or listeners not
instrumentally but as the end result of our concern, the fact that the government may be speaking is of little
moment.” (footnote omitted)).
108 See Abner S. Greene, Government of the Good, 53 VAND. L. REV. 1, 45 (2000) (“No choice is made
exogenously to the various authority structures in which one lives (e.g., government–citizen, parent–child,
spouse–spouse, friend–friend, human being–God, etc.). We make choices under the influence of many whom
we consider authorities . . . . [W]e must accept choice in a web of power relations. We must deem
nonautonomous only those choices made under the influence of particularly overbearing power, and not
simply because of deference to authority, be it of the state or of any other person or corporate entity.”).
109 Id. at 41–42. The Supreme Court has recognized the difference between coercive and persuasive
speech in the private context as well—for example, by interpreting the First Amendment to permit statutory
restrictions on private parties’ speech that rises to the level of regulable conduct because of its coercive effects.
See, e.g., Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass’n, 436 U.S. 447, 457 (1978) (“[I]n-person solicitation may exert
pressure and often demands an immediate response, without providing an opportunity for comparison or
reflection.”); NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co., 395 U.S. 575, 618–20 (1969) (“If there is any implication that an
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[O]ne of the basic principles underlying the strong protection of
private speech is that the persuasive effect of speech is not a proper
reason for regulation. Only when there is no time for
counterargument, or when persuasion will not cure the original harm,
do we permit regulation of speech.
We should think no differently about government speech.
Assuming that dissent is open, and assuming no monopolization, we
should consider even quite persuasive government speech to be just
that, quite persuasive, and hold fast the distinction between
110
persuasion and coercion.

To illustrate the difference between the government’s coercive and
persuasive efforts, recall Wooley v. Maynard, where the Supreme Court held
that New Hampshire could not require an objecting private speaker to display
the state’s motto on his car’s license plate.111 As the Court held, punishing an
individual for refusing to deliver the government’s chosen message constitutes
governmental coercion, undermining a dissenting individual’s liberty by
forcing her to express views with which she disagrees.112 But Wooley also
suggests the additional proposition that the government retains the power to
express its own views and values, so long as it does not force others to join or
share those views; indeed, the Wooley Court raised no quarrel with New
Hampshire’s expressive choice to feature its motto “Live Free or Die” on the
state’s license plates, only with its efforts to coerce dissenters to display the
motto against their will.113
To further illustrate the distinction between government persuasion and
government coercion, contrast the government’s various policy responses to
the health risks created by smoking. The Surgeon General’s 1964 report on the
dangers of tobacco offers an example of government persuasion, rather than
employer may or may not take action solely on his own initiative for reasons unrelated to economic necessities
and known only to him, the statement is . . . a threat of retaliation based on misrepresentation and coercion,
and as such without the protection of the First Amendment. . . . [E]mployees, who are particularly sensitive to
rumors of plant closings, take such hints as coercive threats rather than honest forecasts.” (footnote omitted));
Watts v. United States, 394 U.S. 705, 707 (1969) (per curiam) (“The Nation undoubtedly has a valid, even an
overwhelming, interest in protecting the safety of its Chief Executive and in allowing him to perform his duties
without interference from threats of physical violence.”).
110 Greene, supra note 108, at 43 (footnote omitted).
111 430 U.S. 705, 713 (1977). For further examples of government coercion of individual expression, see
Rutan v. Republican Party of Illinois, 497 U.S. 62, 74 (1990); and Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347, 355–56
(1976) (plurality opinion).
112 Wooley, 430 U.S. at 715.
113 See id. at 713; see also id. at 717 (“The State is seeking to communicate to others an official view as to
proper appreciation of history, state pride, and individualism. Of course, the State may legitimately pursue
such interests in any number of ways.”).
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coercion: the public was free to read it, or not; those who read it were free to
change their smoking habits, or not.114 The public is similarly free to accept,
reject, or entirely ignore government speech on contested issue campaigns. In
contrast, the government’s requirement that tobacco companies post warnings
on cigarette packages and advertisements115 is coercive (albeit potentially still
constitutional as a factual disclosure required of a commercial speaker to
ensure adequate consumer information): tobacco companies face fines116 and
other sanctions117 if they fail to comply.118
As another example, some expressive settings may offer the potential for
coercing listeners’ beliefs or behavior. For instance, the government appears to
be acting more as a regulator than as just another participant in the marketplace
of ideas when it speaks without disclosing its message’s governmental origins:
its deception as to the source of its message suggests an effort to mislead the
public into giving the message greater credibility than it would otherwise.119
Because purposefully masking a message’s governmental source may improve
its reception in certain circumstances, government manipulation of the public’s
attitudes toward its views by deliberately obscuring its identity as the speaker
smacks more of coercion than simple persuasion.120
The government’s monopolistic speech to a captive audience also raises the
possibility of coercing listeners’ beliefs or behavior, in that listeners may not
be free to avoid, resist, or counter the government’s message.121 Indeed,
concerns of this type may explain at least some of the initial controversy when,

114 See PUB. HEALTH SERV., U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH, EDUC., & WELFARE, PUB. NO. 1103, SMOKING AND
HEALTH: REPORT OF THE ADVISORY COMMITTEE TO THE SURGEON GENERAL OF THE PUBLIC HEALTH SERVICE
(1964).
115 15 U.S.C. § 1333 (2006).
116 Id. § 1338.
117 Id. § 1339.
118 Although government coercion of private parties’ speech raises substantial First Amendment issues,
such regulation is not always unconstitutional—especially in the context of commercial speech like cigarette
labels and advertisements. See, e.g., Commonwealth Brands, Inc. v. United States, 678 F. Supp. 2d 512, 532
(W.D. Ky. 2010) (holding that such regulation of commercial speech satisfies the First Amendment because it
is sufficiently tailored to meet a substantial government interest).
119 See Gia B. Lee, Persuasion, Transparency, and Government Speech, 56 HASTINGS L.J. 983, 1009–15
(2005); Lawrence Lessig, The Regulation of Social Meaning, 62 U. CHI. L. REV. 943 (1995).
120 See Lee, supra note 119, at 984–88.
121 See Caroline Mala Corbin, The First Amendment Right Against Compelled Listening, 89 B.U. L. REV.
939 (2009) (suggesting a constitutional right against government-compelled listening, especially in contexts
that raise captive-audience concerns like state-mandated abortion counseling or diversity training); Redish &
Finnerty, supra note 106, at 99 (identifying free speech concerns with respect to government speech in public
schools that seeks to indoctrinate “a captive audience of undeveloped and impressionable minds”).
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shortly after his inauguration, President Obama announced plans to deliver a
speech to be broadcast to all public schools122—a controversy that largely
evaporated upon disclosure of the speech’s apolitical content.123 In evaluating
whether and when government expression is coercive, Professors Redish and
Finnerty have similarly emphasized the importance of context:
As a general matter, no one worries that the government is
seeking to “indoctrinate” adults when, for instance, the President
gives his State of the Union address or some administrative agency
issues a report on an issue of national concern. The reasons are
obvious: Adults are not a captive audience compelled to listen to the
government’s speech, and often another party presents competing
speech as a countermessage. Moreover, although young minds are
not fully developed and presumably are more susceptible to
indoctrination because they lack the ability to think critically and
evaluate messages, we presume adults are capable of analyzing the
124
variety of messages they hear on a daily basis.

But contemporary debates over ballot measures or legislative proposals
rarely, if ever, involve government’s monopolistic speech to a captive
audience. Recall that governmental campaign speech generally takes the form
of government officials’ statements and press releases critical or supportive of
pending ballot or legislative measures, as well as government agencies’ reports
and analyses, flyers, pamphlets, newsletter articles, website postings, and print
and broadcast advertisements communicating their view of such measures to
the public. In none of these contexts is the audience captive, nor is there any
paucity of opportunity for dissent and counterargument.125

122 See Joshua Rhett Miller, Critics Decry Obama’s ‘Indoctrination’ Plan for Students, FOXNEWS.COM
(Sept. 2, 2009), http://www.foxnews.com/politics/2009/09/02/critics-decry-obamas-indoctrination-planstudents/.
123 See Obama Urges Students to Work Hard, Stay in School, CNN.COM (Sept. 8, 2009, 7:17 PM), http://
www.cnn.com/2009/POLITICS/09/08/obama.school.speech/index.html.
124 Redish & Finnerty, supra note 106, at 90.
125 Indeed, monopolistic government speech is increasingly unlikely given changes in communications
technology that enable more speakers to participate, expanding opportunities for dissent and counterspeech.
See Schauer, supra note 72, at 380 (“Although the quantity of government speech is no doubt increasing, and
technological advances may make it possible for the government to convey its messages more efficiently, we
should not forget that concomitant increases and improvements in private sector communication probably
match this development. There seems to be no evidence whatsoever that the proportion of government speech
within the total universe of communication is increasing. In fact, it seems quite possible that it is decreasing.”).
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In short, there remains a meaningful distinction between government
coercion and government persuasion.126 That the government acts as both
regulator and as speaker does not mean that we cannot parse those roles for
constitutional purposes.127
2. Expectations of the Government’s Expressive Neutrality Are Unwise and
Unrealistic
Not only is the government’s expressive neutrality unnecessary to prevent
government coercion and protect individual autonomy, but expectations of
such neutrality are also generally impracticable. Numerous scholars have
directly (and, in my opinion, powerfully and effectively) challenged the notion
that the government’s role as sovereign requires its neutrality on contested
issues. Joseph Tussman, for example, observed that “[t]he danger in the
careless use of notions of neutrality and non-partisanship is that the concern for
fairness may be taken as requiring the relinquishing of commitment.”128 More
recently, Abner Greene urged that “government in a liberal democracy not
only may promote contested views of the good, but should do so, as well.”129
As Steven Smith noted, “[T]here is nothing inherently problematic about

126 Although I see a real distinction between the government’s persuasive and coercive speech, I am
considerably more skeptical that another distinction proposed by some courts—permitting the government’s
informational or factual but not persuasive expression—is meaningful. See, e.g., Harrison v. Rainey, 179
S.E.2d 923, 925 (Ga. 1971) (authorizing expenditures for a legal memorandum on the effects of, but not for
advocacy materials regarding, a proposed state constitutional amendment); Rees v. Carlisle, 153 P.3d 1131,
1138–39 (Haw. 2007) (interpreting a statute to permit the government’s informational but not persuasive
speech on a pending ballot measure); Stern v. Kramarsky, 375 N.Y.S.2d 235, 239–40 (Sup. Ct. Spec. Term
1975) (suggesting that the government’s “factual” speech on the ERA, but not its advocacy in support of the
proposal, is legally permissible). Efforts to distinguish between “factual” and persuasive speech face ofteninsuperable challenges because the speaker’s most basic choices about her “factual” presentation can be
intentionally and effectively persuasive, depending on quantity, order, contrast, tone, etc. See Martin H. Redish
& Abby Marie Mollen, Understanding Post’s and Meiklejohn’s Mistakes: The Central Role of Adversary
Democracy in the Theory of Free Expression, 103 NW. U. L. REV. 1303, 1338–39 (2009) (“[I]t
is . . . impossible to separate information from opinion because the use of information is often a central
element in the persuasive nature of opinion. . . . [I]nformation is often conveyed, not as an end in itself, but
rather as part and parcel of an effort to employ the system of public discourse to achieve certain normative and
personal goals.”).
127 See Alan K. Chen, Right Labels, Wrong Categories: Some Comments on Steven D. Smith’s Why Is
Government Speech Problematic?, DENV. U. L. REV. ONLINE (Aug. 12, 2010, 9:14 AM), http://www.
denverlawreview.org/government-speech/2010/8/12/right-labels-wrong-categories-some-comments-on-stevend-smit.html (“First Amendment doctrine appropriately distinguishes between the[] two scenarios because the
government’s own speech can rarely influence the public debate in the same qualitative or quantitative way as
when it excludes private speakers’ ideas from the marketplace.”).
128 JOSEPH TUSSMAN, GOVERNMENT AND THE MIND 80 (1977).
129 Greene, supra note 108, at 2.
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government speech, even on matters about which citizens energetically
disagree,”130 and as Alan Chen observed, “[N]eutrality would forbid the
government ever to adopt a policy, which is the function of government in the
first instance.”131
I join these commentators in rejecting the contentions of Professors
Kamenshine, Ziegler, and other government speech critics132 that the
government should—or indeed, could, as a practical matter—remain neutral on
contested policy matters. Such a thin conception of the government’s
appropriate functions is neither wise as a matter of policy nor realistic as a
matter of observing and describing how democratic governments actually
work.133 Indeed, the government’s noncoercive speech generally furthers the
other values most often identified at the heart of the First Amendment:
facilitating participation in democratic self-governance by informing voters of
their government’s priorities and encouraging the discovery of truth and
dissemination of knowledge by adding to the marketplace of ideas.
For these reasons, expectations of the government’s expressive neutrality
are now a dead letter as a matter of constitutional law outside the campaign
context because the Supreme Court’s emerging government speech doctrine
acknowledges that the government inevitably has views that the Constitution
permits it to express. Indeed, even those Justices skeptical of the majority’s
approach to government speech nonetheless also reject the premise that the
First Amendment bars government from spending money to articulate a view
with which some (or even many) taxpayers disagree.134 Recognizing that an
effective government must take positions on a wide variety of matters, even the

130

Smith, supra note 46, at 952.
Chen, supra note 127.
132 See supra notes 41–43 and accompanying text.
133 See Nat’l Endowment for the Arts v. Finley, 524 U.S. 569, 598 (1998) (Scalia, J., concurring in the
judgment) (“It is the very business of government to favor and disfavor points of view on (in modern times, at
least) innumerable subjects—which is the main reason we have decided to elect those who run the
government, rather than save money by making their posts hereditary.”).
134 Johanns v. Livestock Mktg. Ass’n, 544 U.S. 550, 559 (2005); id. at 574 (Souter, J., dissenting) (“The
first point of certainty is the need to recognize the legitimacy of government’s power to speak despite
objections by dissenters whose taxes or other exactions necessarily go in some measure to putting the
offensive message forward to be heard. To govern, government has to say something, and a First Amendment
heckler’s veto of any forced contribution to raising the government’s voice in the ‘marketplace of ideas’ would
be out of the question.” (footnote omitted)).
131
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dissenters agreed that private speakers can constitutionally be compelled to
pay for government speech from which they dissent.135
Although this subpart has concluded that expectations of the government’s
expressive neutrality are generally both unwise and unrealistic, the possibility
remains that certain government speech in certain contexts threatens specific
dangers that may justify its constraint. This leads to the next question of
whether there are specific dangers posed not by the government’s deviation
from expressive neutrality generally, but instead by the government’s deviation
from expressive neutrality in the campaign context specifically. In considering
this question, the remainder of this Part draws from lessons learned in parallel
debates over when, if ever, private speakers’ persuasive efforts in the campaign
context should be considered sufficiently threatening to First Amendment
values to justify their regulation.
B. Responding to Critiques of Powerful Parties’ Campaign Speech
Some critics perceive governmental campaign speech on pending ballot or
legislative measures as repugnant to an equality-based view of the Free Speech
Clause. In other words, they see the government’s campaign speech as tilting
the playing field to its advantage because the government’s greater power,
prestige, and resources may ultimately change actual political outcomes in
ways that are fundamentally unfair to dissenting speakers. They fear that this is
especially, but not only, the case when government campaign speech is
supported by public funds for printing, dissemination, and other costs. Note
that this objection is a critique of the instrumental effects of campaign speech
by powerful actors generally, where government is among those powerful
actors. In other words, whereas the arguments described in the preceding
subpart focused on the government as a unique speaker because of its
sovereign status, the arguments explored in this subpart focus on campaign

135 See id. In considering this First Amendment challenge to a generic beef promotion campaign
implemented by the Department of Agriculture and funded by taxes targeted at beef producers, the Johanns
majority and dissenters differed vigorously, however, on the question whether government must identify itself
as the source of that speech to successfully assert the government speech defense to the plaintiffs’ free speech
claim. Compare id. at 562 (majority opinion) (“When . . . the government sets the overall message to be
communicated and approves every word that is disseminated, it is not precluded from relying on the
government-speech doctrine merely because it solicits assistance from nongovernmental sources in developing
specific messages.”), with id. at 571–72 (Souter, J., dissenting) (“[I]f government relies on the governmentspeech doctrine . . . , it must make itself politically accountable by indicating that the content actually is a
government message, not just the statement of one self-interested group the government is currently willing to
invest with power.”).
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Recall that the First Amendment is often understood to protect speech
(especially political speech) not only to protect the individual liberty interests
of potential speakers but also to serve certain instrumental goals by ensuring
listeners’ access to views that will inform their decisions (and especially their
political decisions).136 As Professors Redish and Mollen explain:
[P]ublic opinion cannot be formed without the evaluation and
ultimate acceptance of certain ideas over others, the listener
participates in the formation of public opinion as much as the speaker
does. Just as the speaker may benefit by contributing to public
discourse, so too may listeners’ moral and intellectual horizons be
expanded by the receipt of information and opinion. Their ability to
function as active participants in a democracy is improved as a result.
More importantly, government’s decision to insulate citizens from
information and opinion because of a paternalistic distrust of their
ability to make wise choices is as threatening to core democratic
137
values as the suppression of any speaker.

To achieve these instrumental aims, First Amendment theory thus often
assumes the “rational actor” model that the more speech from all sources, the
better for listeners’ ultimate decision making.138 Under this view, one party’s
speech does not threaten the equality interests of other speakers because all are
free to compete in the marketplace of ideas.

136 See ALEXANDER MEIKLEJOHN, FREE SPEECH AND ITS RELATION TO SELF-GOVERNMENT 25 (1948)
(“The final aim of the [town] meeting is the voting of wise decisions. The voters, therefore, must be made as
wise as possible. The welfare of the community requires that those who decide issues shall understand them.
They must know what they are voting about. And this, in turn, requires that so far as time allows, all facts and
interests relevant to the problem shall be fully and fairly presented to the meeting. . . . What is essential is not
that everyone shall speak, but that everything worth saying shall be said.”); Redish & Mollen, supra note 126,
at 1307 (“[A] valid democratic theory of the First Amendment must protect all speech that allows individuals
to discover their personal needs, interests, and goals—in government and in society at large—and to advocate
and vote accordingly.”); see also Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 77 (1964) (recognizing “the paramount
public interest in a free flow of information to the people concerning public officials, their servants”).
137 Redish & Mollen, supra note 126, at 1337 (footnotes omitted).
138 As Lyrissa Barnett Lidsky explains, “[T]he modern trend . . . has been to assume that audiences are
savvy and sophisticated, capable of sorting through masses of information to discover truth, however
provisional or contested. Indeed, these assumptions underpin two articles of faith in modern First Amendment
theory: (1) audiences are capable of rationally evaluating the truth, quality, credibility, and usefulness of core
speech without the aid of government intervention; and (2) more speech is better than less.” Lyrissa Barnett
Lidsky, Nobody’s Fools: The Rational Audience as First Amendment Ideal, 2010 U. ILL. L. REV. 799, 810–11.
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On the other hand, many skeptics remain unconvinced that more speech
inevitably improves listeners’ decision making.139 This skepticism is illustrated
by longstanding efforts to regulate private parties’ campaign speech, which are
equality-focused efforts based in part on the premise that certain powerful
speakers’ political expression will overwhelm or otherwise undermine the
views of dissenting speakers.140
This divide over the accuracy of the rational actor model (and thus over the
comparative benefits and dangers of powerful parties’ campaign speech) in
many ways mirrors that described by Daniel Ortiz in understanding voters
either as “civic smart[ies]” (“individuals [who] make highly informed political
choices” after carefully acquiring and sorting available information) or as
“civic slob[s]” (passive and uniformed voters who do not engage in the same
cognitive effort, instead relying largely on “images, feelings, and
emotions”).141 Although one need not rely on the pejorative “slob” to conclude
that many time-strapped voters rely on shortcuts to help inform their decisions,
one’s view of the instrumental value and dangers of campaign speech (by any
speaker, private or governmental) turns in great part on one’s assessment of
how listeners process speech of this type.
For those who identify a—and perhaps the—primary First Amendment
value as facilitating participation in democratic self-governance,142 the key
question then becomes whether the government’s expressive participation in
debates over ballot and legislative measures furthers or frustrates that aim. The
remainder of this Part explores how the government’s campaign speech can
help inform the decisions of both informed and comparatively uninformed
voters without threatening the equality interests of other speakers.

139

See, e.g., James A. Gardner, Comment, Protecting the Rationality of Electoral Outcomes: A Challenge
to First Amendment Doctrine, 51 U. CHI. L. REV. 892, 892 (1984) (“A central though rarely articulated
premise of many election laws and much democratic theory is that electoral outcomes should be rational rather
than irrational—that they should reflect the true, reasoned, and informed choice of the people. Unfortunately,
as political scientists have shown, people do not always vote rationally.”).
140 See, e.g., J. Skelly Wright, Money and the Pollution of Politics: Is the First Amendment an Obstacle to
Political Equality?, 82 COLUM. L. REV. 609, 640 (1982) (“When the forum is limited by physical,
technological, or economic factors, the messages of some speakers must be limited if all points of view are to
be heard, so that the audience may enjoy a full range of uninhibited debate.”).
141 Daniel R. Ortiz, The Engaged and the Inert: Theorizing Political Personality Under the First
Amendment, 81 VA. L. REV. 1, 4 (1995). Professor Ortiz himself finds both models incomplete. Ortiz, supra.
142 See, e.g., Robert Post, Participatory Democracy and Free Speech, 97 VA. L. REV. 477, 482 (2011)
(“[T]he best possible explanation of the shape of First Amendment doctrine is the value of democratic selfgovernance.”).
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1. Governmental Campaign Speech Can Provide Valuable Information for
Comparatively Sophisticated Voters
Government expression can valuably further citizens’ capacities to
participate in democratic self-governance by enabling them to identify and
assess—positively or negatively—their government’s priorities and
performance.143 For these reasons, as I have urged elsewhere,144 the primary
value of government speech turns not on its popularity or even its wisdom,145
but instead on its transparency—when members of the public can actually
identify the government as the message’s source, “maximiz[ing] prospects for
meaningful credibility assessment and political accountability.”146 Examples of
transparency in this context include speeches made by or quotes attributed to
specified government officials in their official capacity, as well as press
releases, reports, pamphlets, online postings, and advertisements by identified
government agencies. In this way, government expression provides great
instrumental value because of what it offers its listeners: information that
furthers the public’s ability to evaluate its government.147
Moreover, the government’s voice may be particularly knowledgeable on
some issues, potentially adding valuable new perspectives to the ideas and
143 See, e.g., 2 ZECHARIAH CHAFEE, JR., COMM’N ON FREEDOM OF THE PRESS, GOVERNMENT AND MASS
COMMUNICATIONS 723 (1947) (“Now it is evident that government must itself talk and write and even
listen.”); THOMAS I. EMERSON, THE SYSTEM OF FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION 698 (1970) (“Participation by the
government in the system of freedom of expression is an essential feature of any democratic society. It enables
the government to inform, explain, and persuade—measures especially crucial in a society that attempts to
govern itself with a minimum use of force. Government participation also greatly enriches the system; it
provides the facts, ideas, and expertise not available from other sources.”); Martin H. Redish & Daryl I.
Kessler, Government Subsidies and Free Expression, 80 MINN. L. REV. 543, 565 (1996) (“From the
perspective of democratic theory, it is essential that these government employees inform the populace of the
government’s policies and initiatives. Because the government informs the populace about its functioning
through these subsidies, it facilitates self-government by providing members of the community with
information and data on which to judge the performance of its political leaders. As a result, the electorate is
better able to check elected officials and hold them accountable.”); Shiffrin, supra note 55, at 604 (describing
government speech as providing the public with “the advantage of knowing the collective judgment of the
legislature and of knowing the views of its representatives, which would in turn be useful for evaluating
them”).
144 See Helen Norton, Constraining Public Employee Speech: Government’s Control of Its Workers’
Speech to Protect Its Own Expression, 59 DUKE L.J. 1 (2009); see also Norton & Citron, supra note 5.
145 Recall, as just one of many examples, the insights into government policymaking provided to the
public by the Pentagon Papers (a Department of Defense study that reviewed U.S. military and diplomatic
policy in Indochina). See N.Y. Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 714 (1971) (per curiam) (rejecting
the government’s efforts to stop publication of the Pentagon Papers).
146 Helen Norton, The Measure of Government Speech: Identifying Expression’s Source, 88 B.U. L. REV.
587, 632 (2008).
147 Id.
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arguments available for voters’ consideration.148 Indeed, because many
initiatives and referenda directly implicate government services and their
financing, affected governmental bodies may have unique expertise to offer
voters on the merits of such measures. Consider, as just one example, a series
of three 2010 Colorado ballot measures generated by private parties that
proposed to cut at least a billion dollars annually in state taxes (and thus
government funding).149 Supporters characterized the measure as “forc[ing] the
government to operate more efficiently and cut bloated spending.”150 In
response, the state’s governor joined business leaders to urge voters to reject
the measures, arguing that they could have a devastating effect on the state
economy that “would set Colorado back a generation.”151 More specifically,
“[Governor] Ritter pledged to rally against the three ballot measures at every
speech he gives until the vote in November,”152 “call[ing] them ‘three of the
most backward-thinking ballot measures this state has ever seen.’”153 The point
is not that the government’s views are necessarily correct, but instead that they
may provide value to voters by exposing the views of those who would be
charged with implementing the measure if enacted.
Those who are inclined to characterize listeners as “civic smarties” should
thus be especially comfortable with the addition of the government’s voice to
the marketplace of ideas in contested policy debates because the government’s
campaign expression contributes to the information available to voters for
consideration.154

148

Id. at 589–90.
See Steve Raabe, Ritter Bashes Tax-Cut Initiatives, DENVER POST, May 14, 2010, at A1.
150 Id.
151 Id. (internal quotation mark omitted).
152 Aldo Svaldi, Political Foes Turn Partners, DENVER POST, May 24, 2010, at A18.
153 Editorial, Candidates Weigh In on Right Side of Ballot Items, DENVER POST, Feb. 28, 2010, at D3.
154 The Supreme Court has noted on several occasions the informational value of private parties’
campaign speech with respect to contested ballot measures when rejecting limitations on such speech. See
Citizens Against Rent Control v. City of Berkeley, 454 U.S. 290, 299 (1981) (“Whatever may be the state
interest . . . in regulating and limiting contributions to or expenditures of a candidate[,] . . . there is no
significant state or public interest in curtailing debate and discussion of a ballot measure.”); First Nat’l Bank of
Bos. v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 777 (1978) (“The inherent worth of the speech in terms of its capacity for
informing the public does not depend upon the identity of its source, whether corporation, association, union,
or individual.”).
149
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2. Governmental Campaign Speech Can Provide a Valuable Heuristic for
Comparatively Uninformed Voters
The government’s campaign speech may also offer great benefit even to
those inclined to adopt the “civic slob” model when describing voters’
behavior. Transparently governmental speech provides a valuable heuristic, or
cognitive shortcut, for those with neither the time nor the expertise to analyze
the competing arguments themselves. Indeed, a significant body of evidence
suggests that reliance on heuristics may enable comparatively uninformed
voters to vote as “competently”—to vote in a way consistent with their own
policy preferences—as comparatively well-informed voters.155
As Michael Kang argues specifically with respect to ballot measures:
[T]he source of voter confusion in direct democracy is not political
ignorance or heavy campaign spending, as commonly alleged, but the
scarcity of “heuristic cues” . . . . [S]trengthening heuristic cues in
direct democracy offers the best means of rehabilitating voter
competence pragmatically, at low cost, without trying to force voters
156
to adjust the way they think about politics.

Among the most effective of these heuristics is knowledge of the opinions
of trusted—or distrusted—third parties, who might include experts, community
leaders, and government speakers. As a general illustration of government as
comparatively trusted speaker, recall the Surgeon General’s report on the
dangers of tobacco, which responded to the tobacco industry’s well-financed
155 See, e.g., James N. Druckman, Does Political Information Matter?, 22 POL. COMM. 515, 515 (2005)
(summarizing a study finding that “citizens can compensate for a lack of political information by using
shortcuts to make the same decisions they would have made if they had that information”—“that many poorly
informed voters (who lacked knowledge about the initiatives’ details) used elite endorsements (e.g., from
interest groups) to emulate the behavior of well-informed . . . voters”); Michael S. Kang, Democratizing Direct
Democracy: Restoring Voter Competence Through Heuristic Cues and “Disclosure Plus,” 50 UCLA L. REV.
1141, 1161 (2003) (“[R]eliance on heuristic cues is a learned practice based on past success and accuracy.
Voting behavior in candidate elections, when heuristic cues are readily available, is relatively rational,
consistent, and well-ordered, whereas in issue elections, particularly when heuristic cues are difficult to find,
voting behavior appears more random, irrational, and contradictory. Without heuristic cues, voters in direct
democracy are more confused, [and] money is more influential . . . . Even if they do not cure voter confusion
in every instance, voters armed with heuristic cues will be much more likely to vote competently in the face of
complexity than will voters without them.” (footnote omitted)). For a more critical assessment of heuristics’
value to voters, see Molly J. Walker Wilson, Behavioral Decision Theory and Implications for the Supreme
Court’s Campaign Finance Jurisprudence, 31 CARDOZO L. REV. 679, 703–06 (2010).
156 Kang, supra note 155, at 1141; accord id. at 1164–65 (“[M]uch of the electorate is rationally ignorant
and unlikely to become more engaged in a way that cures concerns about voter confusion. . . . Heuristic cues
quickly put uninformed voters on roughly equal footing with better-informed voters, even if they do not
transform civic slackers into infallible or perfectly informed voters.”).
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speech.157 This dynamic proves accurate in the campaign context as well, as
Professor Kang explains:
Underlying policy specifics are less useful to the average citizen than
knowing the synthesized opinion of a trusted leader. As a result,
when they know what an identifiable politician thinks about an issue,
people report a great deal more certainty about their own attitude,
compared to when they based their attitude purely on policy
information.
....
A normative endorsement of heuristic reasoning thus flows from
a realistic acknowledgment of the central role that political elites play
in American politics. It is a wishful endeavor to pray that citizens can
become better individual democrats, without also considering the
powerful function of politicians, activists, interest groups, and other
elites. . . . In short, citizens depend on political elites to gather
political information and synthesize deliberative judgments for
158
them.

Providing voters access to the government’s transparently sourced views on
often-confusing ballot measures thus provides the public with a potentially
valuable heuristic.159
Again, government’s views are by no means necessarily wise, popular, or
persuasive; instead, they simply provide considerable heuristic value to voters
who know whether their values align with those of the government speaker.160
Whether the government’s views persuade or dissuade any particular voter
depends on whether that voter views the government speaker with trust or
distrust.161 Indeed, some number of voters will always disagree with the
government.
157

See, e.g., PUB. HEALTH SERV., supra note 114 (describing the adverse health effects of smoking).
Kang, supra note 155, at 1161–62.
159 See id. at 1169 (“People have plentiful access to political information, but otherwise busy and semiinterested voters need information disseminated to them in a way that requires them to take no affirmative
steps or do anything more than they otherwise would do. Unless campaign finance information is delivered to
voters at virtually no cost to them, such information may never reach them and will always remain too difficult
for voters to acquire. Voters must be made aware of such heuristic cues to take advantage of them.”).
160 See Schauer, supra note 72, at 385 (“In the face of almost completely unrestrained criticism of
government from all quarters, . . . views about the ability of government to use speech to falsify consent seem
to require such a negative view of popular competence as to call into question the very reasons for considering
democracy or majoritarianism to be any good at all.”).
161 See, e.g., June Fessenden-Raden et al., Providing Risk Information in Communities: Factors
Influencing What Is Heard and Accepted, SCI. TECH. & HUM. VALUES, Summer/Fall 1987, at 94, 96 (finding
that the trust people have in political institutions varies, as does their trust in the information provided by such
governments); Schauer, supra note 72, at 381 (“[A]ntigovernment biases may be so great, particularly with
158
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3. Governmental Campaign Speech Can Provide a Valuable Response to
Campaign Speech from Powerful, Private Sources
Government speech, moreover, can be especially important to an equalitybased conception of free speech when its voice counters that of powerful,
private speakers.162 This remains especially true in the specific context of
often-confusing ballot measures, where the government’s expression not
infrequently counters that of powerful, private interests. Indeed, government
expression’s ability to further the First Amendment’s democracy-enhancing
purposes may now be particularly heightened in light of the current Supreme
Court’s unwillingness to permit limitation on the quantity of political speech
from corporate and other private interests. In Citizens United v. FEC, the Court
held that the First Amendment prohibits efforts to regulate corporations’
independent expenditures to support or oppose candidates for office.163
Emphatically rejecting equality-based arguments that such regulations
justifiably protect the marketplace of ideas from distortions due to the
disproportionate volume of speech from wealthy speakers,164 the majority
refused to characterize certain speech as unusually dangerous based on its
(corporate) source.165
Now that the quantity of corporate political speech is largely unregulated,
government expression that counters that of private interests may prove
especially valuable to both informed and comparatively uninformed voters. For
reference to the veracity of political leaders, that much government speech may encounter a public strongly
predisposed to disbelief.”); Leigh Contreras, Comment, Contemplating the Dilemma of Government as
Speaker: Judicially Identified Limits on Government Speech in the Context of Carter v. City of Las Cruces, 27
N.M. L. REV. 517, 539–40 (1997) (“[V]oters may tend to defer to the government’s judgment—although the
assumption that government has an especially influential effect on the people depends on the public’s
reverence and respect for government.” (footnote omitted)).
162 Abner Greene has made this point about government speech more generally, outside of the specific
campaign context that is the focus of this Article. See Greene, supra note 108, at 9, 11 (“[G]overnment speech
often makes a distinctive contribution to public debate. If the government’s point of view were simply
corroborative of private points of view, the affirmative argument for government speech would weaken as the
concerns about government power rise. . . . Moreover, government persuasion on a contested matter plays an
important role in countering private power. As one locus of power in society, government can check
agglomerations of private power, just as checks on government ensure that it be only one voice among many.
Additionally, even in a contested arena government speech can help foster debate, fleshing out views, and
leading toward a more educated citizenry and a better chance of reaching the right answer.” (footnote
omitted)).
163 130 S. Ct. 876, 908–09 (2010).
164 Id. at 904–05.
165 Id. at 905. For arguments that Citizens United was wrongly decided even if one focuses on a libertybased view of the First Amendment, see Molly J. Walker Wilson, Too Much of a Good Thing: Campaign
Speech After Citizens United, 31 CARDOZO L. REV. 2365 (2010).
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example, in the 2008 election cycle, the governor of Colorado engaged in a
“statewide ‘Truth Tour’” aimed at countering the arguments by powerful,
private opponents of a ballot measure to end a tax credit for the oil and gas
industry.166 The governor’s advocacy came in response to assertions by the
amendment’s opponents, who included oil and gas companies and the Denver
Metro Chamber of Commerce, that terminating the tax credit would “drive oil
and gas companies to other states. That move will negatively impact
Colorado’s economy, taking away jobs and adversely affecting those cities and
towns that rely on the industry.”167 Again, the point is not that the
government’s views are necessarily correct, but instead that they may provide
value by responding to speech from powerful, private parties that might
otherwise not face effective rebuttal.168
Along these lines, the government’s campaign speech may also be
especially important given the frequent use of ballot measures by powerful,
private parties to seek to restrict minority rights. Consider, as just one of many
examples, the California Real Estate Association’s 1964 proposed ballot
measure to repeal the state’s fair housing law that prohibited racial
discrimination in the sale or lease of property.169 Opposed to any “open
housing” laws,170 the real estate association started with one hundred thousand
dollars in “seed money.”171 Opponents of the measure included not only a wide
variety of civil rights and other private groups but also California Governor Pat
Brown172 and Senator Pierre Salinger.173

166 Gayle Perez, Ritter: Amendment 58 Foes Using Scare Tactics, PUEBLO CHIEFTAIN (Oct. 10, 2008),
http://www.chieftain.com/news/local/ritter-amendment-foes-using-scare-tactics/article_e7c5ae2f-0d70-56e4a4cb-26096f2209ee.html (“Ritter said the amendment will not raise taxes, but simply removes the tax credit
that oil and gas companies have been receiving from the state for more than three decades. Of the money the
state will keep from those credits, at least 60 percent will be devoted to providing financial aid to low-income
resident[] students who attend a state public college or university. The remaining money will be used for
wildlife habitat protection, renewable energy grants and to local communities impacted by oil and gas
industry.”).
167 Cari Merrill, Dems Make Case for 58, FORT COLLINS COLORADOAN, Sept. 27, 2008, at A11.
168 See, e.g., DAVID MICHAELS, DOUBT IS THEIR PRODUCT: HOW INDUSTRY’S ASSAULT ON SCIENCE
THREATENS YOUR HEALTH 85–90, 201 (2008) (documenting efforts by tobacco companies to contest claims of
the health hazards of cigarettes and by oil companies to cast doubt on scientists’ claims on the role of fossil
fuels in contributing to climate change).
169 See California: Proposition 14, TIME, Sept. 25, 1964, at 23, 23, available at http://www.time.com/
time/magazine/article/0,9171,876158-1,00.html.
170 Id.
171 Totton J. Anderson & Eugene C. Lee, The 1964 Election in California, 18 W. POL. Q. 451, 470 (1965).
172 Id. at 470–71.
173 California Proposition 14, supra note 169, at 23.
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Of course, government speakers are not monolithic in their views on this or
any other issue. Three decades later, California Governor Pete Wilson and
University of California Regent Ward Connerly were among the governmental
speakers that supported Proposition 209, a ballot proposition that amended the
state constitution to prohibit state and local governments’ affirmative action
programs in California.174 Again, the point is simply that the government’s
voice adds to those available to voters collecting information about pending
ballot measures.
Not only are ballot measures often the subject of campaign speech by
powerful and well-financed private parties,175 but the identity of such
powerful, private parties may not be clear, obscuring the public’s efforts to
assess such speakers’ self-interest and credibility:
Interest groups strategically obscure their involvement when they
believe identification would hurt their campaigns. Many industry
groups form political committees to conduct campaign activities
under nondescript names like “Californians for Paycheck Protection”
(religious conservatives supporting limitations on labor union
political activity), “Alliance to Revitalize California” (Silicon Valley
executives supporting a tort reform measure), and “Californians for
Affordable and Reliable Electrical Service” (industry opponents of
176
utility regulation).

Similarly, advocates for statewide initiatives seeking to ban all forms of
affirmative action named themselves the “American Civil Rights Institute,” an
identifier that at least some voters may have found confusing.177

174 Pete Wilson et al., Argument in Favor of Proposition 209, in CALIFORNIA BALLOT PAMPHLET:
GENERAL ELECTION, NOVEMBER 5, 1996, at 32 (1996), available at http://vote96.sos.ca.gov/Vote96/html/BP/
209yesarg.htm.
175 See Kang, supra note 155, at 1148 (“Many direct democracy elections, particularly on economic
measures, attract spectacular disparities in campaign spending between opposing and supporting sides. Indeed,
the consensus from empirical research is that spending advantages are nearly outcome-determinative when
aimed at defeating a ballot measure.”).
176 Id. at 1158–59.
177 See Chris Chambers Goodman, (M)Ad Men: Using Persuasion Factors in Media Advertisements to
Prevent a “Tyranny of the Majority” on Ballot Propositions, 32 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 247, 257
(2010) (“The [organizations’] names are specifically designed, in some[] cases to obfuscate, and these names
of the supporters can be very influential in the outcome of the ballot measure.”); see also Bruce E. Cain,
Commentary, Garrett’s Temptation, 85 VA. L. REV. 1589, 1592–93 (1999) (“Many of the groups that succeed
in getting initiatives on the ballot have primarily economic motives—e.g., insurance companies, lawyers, and
teachers’ unions. To make matters worse from an informational perspective, these groups often adopt false,
generic labels such as ‘Committee for a Just America’ or ‘Campaign for Consumer Justice.’ . . . In an ideal
world, information heuristics would operate like warning labels on consumer items. In reality, those who
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For these reasons, voters often cannot be sure of the source of private
campaign speech and are thus deprived of a key cue to the expression’s
credibility. These dynamics invite a wide range of policy proposals designed to
enhance transparency in the campaign speech context.178 Indeed, the Citizens
United majority itself invited legislatures to pass transparency-forcing
requirements with respect to private campaign speech.179 Whether Congress or
state legislatures do so, however, is a matter of political will subject to
jurisdictional and temporal variation.180 And even when enacted, such
requirements still remain vulnerable to constitutional challenge because the
Court has held that disclosure requirements are subject to “exacting”
scrutiny.181 The government’s voice on ballot issues may thus prove especially
valuable to voters—both informed and uninformed—by responding to private
power that sometimes operates in nontransparent ways.
Not only is private speech often nontransparent, but it is unaccountable to
the public in other ways. For example, courts frequently interpret the First
Amendment to protect false political speech by private speakers.182 The
government’s counterspeech again may serve a valuable checking function.183
For all these reasons, government speech can be understood to further an
sponsor initiatives know that labels can be important, and they choose labels strategically in order to create
images they think voters will receive best.”).
178 See Gilda R. Daniels, Voter Deception, 43 IND. L. REV. 343, 381–86 (2010) (proposing legislative
measures to address voter deception); Goodman, supra note 177, at 294–301 (offering a series of proposals to
require greater transparency of the source of private speech in direct-democracy campaigns).
179 See Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876, 886 (2010) (“The Government may regulate corporate
political speech through disclaimer and disclosure requirements, but it may not suppress that speech
altogether.”).
180 See David G. Savage, Corporate Campaign Spending Still Murky, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 27, 2010, at A1
(“Because of loopholes in tax laws and a weak enforcement policy at the Federal Election Commission,
corporations and wealthy donors have been able to spend huge sums on campaign ads, confident the public
will not know who they are, election law experts say.”); Editorial, The Secret Election, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 19,
2010, at WK8 (noting Congress’s failure to pass disclosure requirements in the immediate aftermath of
Citizens United).
181 Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 64 (1976) (per curiam).
182 See Rickert v. Washington, 168 P.3d 826 (Wash. 2007) (en banc) (striking down an amended statute
that prohibited sponsoring with actual malice a political advertisement containing a false statement of material
fact about a candidate for public office); State ex rel. Pub. Disclosure Comm’n v. 119 Vote No! Comm., 957
P.2d 691 (Wash. 1998) (en banc) (striking down a state statute that prohibited the sponsorship of political
advertisements containing false statements of material fact). But see Vanasco v. Schwartz, 401 F. Supp. 87
(E.D.N.Y. 1975) (characterizing calculated falsehoods during political campaigns as unprotected by the First
Amendment), aff’d mem., 423 U.S. 1041 (1976).
183 See Frederick Schauer, Facts and the First Amendment, 57 UCLA L. REV. 897, 917–18 (2010)
(“[N]either First Amendment theory, nor history, nor doctrine significantly restrict[s] the government’s ability
to attempt to correct widespread public factual inaccuracy . . . .”). I leave for another day the question of
whether the Constitution prohibits government falsehoods.
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equality-based conception of free speech when its voice counters that of
powerful, private speakers.
To be sure, some who take an equality-based view of the First Amendment
may view government speakers—like corporations or other wealthy, private
speakers—as nonetheless threatening to the interests of less powerful speakers.
For example, they may argue that the government’s inherent power, prestige,
and especially resources tilt the playing field such that dissenting speakers
cannot fairly compete.
Of course, the government will not inevitably speak in opposition to
powerful, private interests; indeed, it is often aligned with them. But closer
examination reveals a number of checks that limit the dangers to other
speakers’ equality interests posed by government speech. For example, the
government is by no means monolithic.184 Instead, it comprises a large number
and range of potential government speakers—both individual and
institutional—with various interests. This suggests the possibility of diverse
views even among government speakers, at least some of which may diverge
from the views of powerful, private speakers. Indeed, that government speech
is by no means monolithic both adds to its informational value and detracts
from its potential danger. Different branches of the government can and do
disagree in a way that helps inform voters. Such disagreements occur both
horizontally (for example, when the executive disagrees with the legislature)
and vertically (when federal and state governments disagree). For example,
U.S. Attorney General Eric Holder expressed the U.S. Department of Justice’s
opposition to a proposed California ballot measure to legalize marijuana on the
grounds that it would “greatly complicate federal drug enforcement efforts to
the detriment of our citizens.”185 This prompted counter-speech by the
measure’s proponents who assailed what they characterized as a defense of a
failed war on drugs.186
Such expressive tensions inform and spur debate, while lessening the
chance that government speech is monopolistic. Moreover, the collectiveaction problems confronted by institutional government speakers further
undermine the notion of government as monolithic, and potentially
184

See YUDOF, supra note 72, at 114–16 (describing how federalism, separation of powers, and the
variety of administrative agencies considerably fragment political power, thus undermining the possibility of
monolithic government speech).
185 Letter from Eric H. Holder, Jr., Att’y Gen., to Former Administrators of the Drug Enforcement
Agency (Oct. 13, 2010) (on file with author).
186 John Hoeffel, Holder Vows Fight over Prop. 19, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 16, 2010, at AA1.
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monopolistic, speaker. Indeed, such problems may encourage such speakers to
be more deliberative as a result. And, of course, government speakers remain
politically accountable to the populace in ways untrue of private speakers.187
To be sure, public entities and officials may have considerable self-interest
in the outcome of contested ballot measures and legislative proposals. For
example, such votes may determine the level of funding available to
government. The government’s campaign speech can also be self-interested in
ways other than purely financial—as may be the case with government speech
opposing term limits or government speech otherwise aligned with what the
government speaker sees as its political advantage. But as Professors Redish
and Mollen persuasively explain in another context, a speaker’s self-interested
motivation does not necessarily negate the value of that information to the
listener.188 Although most speakers are self-interested in some way,189 such
motivation rarely justifies limiting their speech (although it may well justify
listeners’ skepticism). What the listener needs, ideally, is an understanding of
the speaker’s self-interest when evaluating her speech.190 As discussed above,
such an understanding may be more readily available with respect to
government, as opposed to private, speech: voters can assess the government
speaker’s self-interest and hold her accountable for it.191
In short, government speech on issue campaigns generally furthers, rather
than frustrates, key constitutional interests. Transparently governmental
campaign speech often provides great value to the public. It enhances political
accountability by informing voters of their governments’ priorities and
preferences, provides a valuable heuristic for comparatively uninformed
187 Compare Joseph Blocher, Viewpoint Neutrality and Government Speech, 52 B.C. L. REV. 695, 717–18
(2011) (“So long as the government identifies itself when speaking, the public can hold government speakers
politically accountable and curb their excesses.”), with Steven Shiffrin, Government Speech and the
Falsification of Consent, 96 HARV. L. REV. 1745, 1752–53 (1983) (reviewing YUDOF, supra note 72)
(“[C]orporations seek profit without concern for externalities and use enormous wealth in ways bearing no
necessary or even likely relationship to the beliefs of their shareholders . . . .” (footnote omitted)).
188 Redish & Mollen, supra note 126, at 1317.
189 See id. at 1341 (“Speakers do not always speak solely to contribute to public discourse or solely for
narrow personal economic gain.”).
190 See First Nat’l Bank of Bos. v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 791–92 (1978) (“[T]he people in our democracy
are entrusted with the responsibility for judging and evaluating the relative merits of conflicting arguments.
They may consider, in making their judgment, the source and credibility of the advocate.” (footnote omitted)).
191 See Citizens Against Rent Control v. City of Berkeley, 454 U.S. 290, 298 (1981) (recognizing a value
to voters of knowing “the identity of those whose money supports or opposes a given ballot measure”);
Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 67 (1976) (per curiam) (“The sources of a candidate’s financial support . . . alert
the voter to the interests to which a candidate is most likely to be responsive and thus facilitate predictions of
future performance in office.”).
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voters, and enriches the marketplace of available ideas and arguments,
especially (but not only) as a counter to expression from powerful, private
sources.
III. CONSIDERING POSSIBLE LIMITATIONS ON GOVERNMENTAL CAMPAIGN
SPEECH
The preceding Part concluded that the government does not violate the
Constitution simply by taking sides in contested ballot or legislative
campaigns. To be sure, however, I do not claim that the government’s
campaign speech is (or should be) entirely free from constraint.192
For example, even though the preceding Part concluded that the
government’s campaign speech on ballot and legislative measures is consistent
with the Free Speech Clause, other constitutional constraints—such as the
Establishment Clause—remain in play as independent checks on government
speech generally, including, but not limited to, the government’s campaign
speech.193 The remainder of this Part briefly explores other possible
limitations.
A. The Transparency Requirement as a Constitutional Limitation on
Government Speech Generally
Recall that the previous Part’s emphasis on the instrumental value of the
government’s campaign speech referred only to transparently governmental
speech—expression that the public can identify as governmental in source and
thus hold the government accountable for it.194 I have urged previously that the
government should be permitted to assert the government speech defense to
free speech challenges only when it can establish that it expressly claimed the
speech as its own when it authorized the communication and that onlookers
understood the speech to be the government’s at the time of its delivery.195 The
192 See Schauer, supra note 72, at 384–85 (“[That the First Amendment does not constrain government
speech] does not mean that government communication is not a constitutional problem under some other
clause of the Constitution, or that it is not a political or moral problem. . . . When government misuses its
power to communicate we do have a problem, but this does not mean that we have a first amendment
problem.” (footnote omitted)).
193 See supra note 19.
194 See supra notes 143–46 and accompanying text.
195 See Norton, supra note 146, at 599 (“[T]he government can establish its entitlement to the government
speech defense only when it establishes itself as the source of that expression both as a formal and as a
functional matter. In other words, government must expressly claim the speech as its own when it authorizes or
creates a communication and onlookers must understand the message to be the government’s at the time of its
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Supreme Court, however, has yet to impose such a constitutional requirement
in the context of government speech more generally196—a doctrinal failure that
I have criticized elsewhere.197 Such a transparency requirement would be
especially valuable in the context of the government’s campaign speech on
contested policy matters because it would maximize the public’s ability to
engage in meaningful political accountability measures as well as in
undeceived assessments of the message’s credibility.198
B. Constitutional Limitations on Government Speech on Candidate
Campaigns
So far this Article has focused on the government’s speech on issue
campaigns—government speech that advocates a position on a contested ballot
measure to be decided by the voters or on contested legislation to be
considered by another governmental body. In contrast, the use of official
government resources to engage in campaign speech endorsing or opposing
specific candidates raises potentially greater threats to First Amendment
interests in restraining the self-perpetuation of incumbents and preventing the
entrenchment of political power.199 This subpart proposes a constitutional
limitation on the government’s expressive participation in candidate, as
opposed to issue, campaigns. Here I focus on the First Amendment as the
primary (but not necessarily only200) constitutional source of such a limitation,
delivery.”). For other commentators’ thoughtful discussions of these and related issues, see Randall P.
Bezanson & William G. Buss, The Many Faces of Government Speech, 86 IOWA L. REV. 1377 (2001);
Caroline Mala Corbin, Mixed Speech: When Speech Is Both Private and Governmental, 83 N.Y.U. L. REV.
605 (2008); Leslie Gielow Jacobs, Who’s Talking? Disentangling Government and Private Speech, 36 U.
MICH. J.L. REFORM 35 (2002); and Gia B. Lee, Persuasion, Transparency, and Government Speech, 56
HASTINGS L.J. 983 (2005).
196 See Johanns v. Livestock Mktg. Ass’n, 544 U.S. 550, 563–64 (2005).
197 See, e.g., Norton & Citron, supra note 5.
198 Private speakers, unlike the government, have autonomy interests protected by the First Amendment.
For this reason, the Court has interpreted the First Amendment to protect private speakers’ anonymity under
certain circumstances. See, e.g., McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm’n, 514 U.S. 334, 357 (1995) (striking down
Ohio’s ban on the distribution of unsigned political leaflets).
199 Recall that this Article focuses only on speech that represents the views of a government entity or
branch, as opposed to individual government officials’ speech expressing their own views on their own time
and at their own expense, as individuals do not relinquish their First Amendment rights to express personal
beliefs upon taking office. See, e.g., Colo. Taxpayers Union, Inc. v. Romer, 750 F. Supp. 1041, 1045 (D. Colo.
1990); see also Republican Party of Minn. v. White, 536 U.S. 765, 788 (2002) (holding that the First
Amendment protects judges’ speech as candidates for judicial elections).
200 Other commentators have plausibly identified other potential constitutional sources of similar
principles, including equal protection and substantive due process. See Erwin Chemerinsky, Protecting the
Democratic Process: Voter Standing to Challenge Abuses of Incumbency, 49 OHIO ST. L.J. 773, 778 (1988)
(“[T]he equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment is violated if the government acts to aid only the
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rooted in an understanding of that provision as informing and empowering the
people’s meaningful self-governance—their free choice about whom to elect.
Such an understanding of the First Amendment thus supports a principle
prohibiting governmental campaign speech that directly seeks to entrench
political power.201
To be sure, identifying impermissibly self-perpetuating government speech
presents significant challenges. Much, and probably most, government speech
on any issue seems inextricable from a government speaker’s self-interest in
reelection. For just one of many contemporary examples, consider the
controversy over federal highway signs that noted that certain construction
projects were funded by the federal stimulus package.202 Critics charged that
the signs amounted to “political boosterism,” while the federal government as
speaker emphasized the signs’ informational function: “taxpayers should know
how stimulus dollars are being spent.”203
Indeed, government speakers are often—and unavoidably—motivated both
by public-minded and self-interested purposes.204 But unless one is willing to
prohibit government speech on issue campaigns as a constitutional matter—
and for the reasons explained in the preceding Part, I am not—perhaps the best
incumbent. . . . Those who support challengers have their votes diluted by abuse of incumbency in exactly the
same way the malapportionment or stuffing of the ballot box lessens the effectiveness of an individual’s
vote.”); Greene, supra note 108, at 38 (noting that efforts to entrench incumbents and thwart challengers
“violate[] one of the two key principles of the famous footnote four [i]n Carolene Products, and should be
deemed invalid” (footnote omitted) (citing United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4
(1938))).
201 See Shiffrin, supra note 55, at 602 (“Citizens are entitled to a government that is neutral in the process
of selecting candidates. Whether or not the concept of self-government is ‘central’ to the first amendment, it is
undeniably an important first amendment value, and the integrity of the democratic process could rightly be
questioned if government officially intervened in the political process to favor particular candidates. Whether
or not the intervention was powerful, it would ipso facto disturb the first amendment equality principle.”
(footnotes omitted)).
202 See Colorado Will Keep Stimulus Highway Signs, STREET (Sept. 28, 2009, 10:53 AM), http://www.
thestreet.com/story/10604159/1/colorado-will-keep-stimulus-highway-signs.html.
203 Id.
204 See, e.g., CHAFEE, supra note 143, at 764–65 (“Some of these quandaries seem to me unavoidable if
we are to have any sort of adequate information service. Effective presentation of any recent achievement of
the government, no matter how completely it is accepted by everybody, cannot help benefiting the party and
the officials who made that achievement possible. . . . In spite of the risks that men who know exactly what
they want and are acquainted with the latest techniques for manipulating public opinion will dispose of large
sums for their personal or departmental advantage, we may be wise to run those risks for the sake of the values
of public information . . . in enabling citizens to govern themselves more intelligently.”); Shiffrin, supra note
55, at 603 (“Non-partisan aspects such as informing the populace of government policy and explaining that
policy are also necessarily partisan because incumbent candidates almost invariably claim that their reelection
is justified by their link to the government policy they explain and defend.”).
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we can do is to root out government speech expressly geared to influencing
results in current, contested candidate elections on the premise that official
government speech most directly connected to candidate electioneering is
generally more dangerous and less valuable than government speech on issue
campaigns. Given that most government speech inevitably includes some mix
of self-interested and public-spirited motivations, this may be more a
difference of degree than a difference in kind. Yet I contend that the difference
still remains meaningful. Thomas Emerson, for example, proposed a similar
test:
The government’s right of expression does not extend to any sphere
that is outside the governmental function. This might not seem to be
much of a limitation; the governmental function certainly covers an
extensive area. Nevertheless the principle does impose some limits.
Thus the government would not be empowered to engage in
expression in direct support of a particular candidate for office. It is
205
not the function of the government to get itself reelected.

Along these lines, I too prefer a constitutional principle that permits
transparently governmental speech on issue, but not candidate, campaigns.
Steven Shiffrin, in contrast, proposes a different principle. Identifying
government expression’s potential threats to the equality interests of dissenting
speakers as a greater danger than that of self-perpetuation, he suggests instead
that the Constitution should be understood to limit the volume or means of the
government’s expressive expenditures in both candidate and issue
campaigns.206 For example, he proposes that the “government should not be
permitted to send mail to its citizens stating its views or adequate provision for
opposing views must be made.”207
Although I appreciate Professor Shiffrin’s thoughtful discussion of the
benefits as well as the dangers of the government’s campaign speech, I find a
constitutional line that turns on the amount of funds spent on the government’s
expressive purposes as especially arbitrary to draw (and instead more
appropriate for possible statutory limitations discussed below than for a
constitutional principle).208 Indeed, such a line seems particularly problematic
given that all government speech requires some expenditure of public
205

EMERSON, supra note 143, at 699.
See Shiffrin, supra note 55, at 617.
207 Id.
208 For a discussion of possible statutory limitations on the government’s expressive expenditures, see
infra notes 210–12 and accompanying text.
206
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resources, even if only in the form of government workers’ time and
opportunity costs. Moreover, the instrumental value of the government’s
campaign speech turns in large part on its actual ability to reach and thus
inform listeners, an ability that often requires money—e.g., money to fund
studies on the implications of a proposal; to publish and disseminate reports,
flyers, and pamphlets; and perhaps to buy advertising. As Alan Chen observes:
To be sure, the government will have a greater chance of
persuading people to agree with its position than a grass roots
political organization with few resources. But so will Microsoft. Or,
after the past Supreme Court term, groups such as Citizens United.
Unless we start requiring something akin to the fairness doctrine
whenever the government engages in speech, which would be both
impracticable and unpalatable, transparency is about the best we can
209
hope for in an imperfect doctrinal world.

For these reasons, I propose a constitutional limitation on the government’s
power to participate expressively in candidate campaigns, while rejecting
constitutional limitations on the government’s expenditure of resources for
expressive purposes more generally. As the next section explains, however,
legislatures remain free to limit such expenditures as a statutory matter.
C. Statutory Limitations on Government Speech on Issue Campaigns
Even if the government’s speech on contested issue campaigns does not
violate the Constitution, as this Article asserts, nonconstitutional solutions
remain available to policymakers interested in constraining the government’s
campaign speech of all types.210
1. Statutory Limitations on the Government’s Expenditures for Expression
Relating to Issue Campaigns
As discussed above, I see no constitutional bar to the government’s ability
to spend public money for expressive purposes, even on matters that divide its
constituents. Indeed, the government does so all the time, as the Supreme
Court has recognized outside of the campaign context.211 But for those who
remain concerned that the government’s access to public funds for expressive
purposes will permit it to drown out the speech of others, and thus monopolize
209

Chen, supra note 127 (endnotes omitted).
As discussed supra note 100, the fact that the government is not a First Amendment rights holder itself
leaves open the possibility that its speech could be constrained through statute and other policy measures.
211 See supra note 134 and accompanying text.
210
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the marketplace of ideas, statutory options remain available, as legislatures
could cap (or entirely prohibit) expenditures for the government’s campaign
speech on ballot measures. Indeed, many state statutes already prohibit any
state employee or officer from using state facilities or funds in “the promotion
of or opposition to a ballot proposition.”212
2. Statutory Limitations on the Government’s Power to Deviate from
Expressive Neutrality in Issue Campaigns
Although this Article concludes that the Constitution does not require the
government’s expressive neutrality with respect to issue campaigns,
nonconstitutional constraints remain available here as well. For example, in his
groundbreaking work on government speech, Mark Yudof suggested that state
legislatures consider amending the default presumption as to whether issuerelated campaign speech by state or local government agencies is authorized
under state statutes that define and limit the powers of such bodies.213 In other
words, he proposed a statutory strategy to limit the enumerated powers of
certain government actors to exclude certain expressive activities.
Indeed, legislatures not uncommonly impose more targeted statutory limits
on government actors’ deviation from expressive neutrality where such
deviation is considered especially dangerous. Consider, as just one example,
state conflict-of-interest laws that prohibit public officials from advocating the
212 WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 42.52.180(1) (West Supp. 2010); accord COLO. REV. STAT. § 1-45117(1)(a)(I) (2010) (prohibiting public entities from expending any public monies from any source for
contributions to a campaign for elected office, or to urge electors to vote in favor of or against any ballot issue
or referred measure); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 26, § 16-119 (West 1997) (prohibiting state officials from
“direct[ing] or authoriz[ing] the expenditure of any public funds under [their] care, except as specifically
authorized by law, to be used either in support of, or in opposition to, any measure which is being referred to a
vote of the people by means of the initiative or referendum, or which citizens of this state are attempting to
have referred to a vote of the people by the initiative or referendum”). Some of these laws, however, permit
public officials to express their views on such measures in certain situations. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN.
§ 9-369b(a) (West 2009) (explaining that its prohibition does “not apply to a written, printed or typed
summary of an official’s views on a proposal or question, which is prepared for any news medium”); FLA.
STAT. ANN. § 106.113(3) (West Supp. 2011) (explaining that its prohibition “does not preclude an elected
official of the local government from expressing an opinion on any issue at any time”); WASH. REV. CODE
ANN. § 42.52.180(2)(a) (explaining that its prohibition does not apply to members of an elected body
expressing their collective opinion on a ballot measure so long as required notice is provided and members of
the public are given approximately the same opportunity to voice opposing viewpoints).
213 See YUDOF, supra note 72, at 47 (“The greatest threat of government domination and distortion of
majoritarian processes emanates from executive bodies and officers. The greatest hope of restraining that
power lies with the legislative branches of government. If a legislative body determines that particular
government expression threatens democratic processes, the courts should not second-guess that decision.”
(footnote omitted)).
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passage or failure of matters in which they have, or may be perceived to have,
a conflict of interest.214
***
Just because such nonconstitutional options are available to policymakers,
however, does not mean that they are necessarily wise. Indeed, because I find
government speech with respect to issue campaigns of such great instrumental
value to the public, I remain uncomfortable with blanket withdrawals of the
government’s expressive authority even as a policy matter. Vastly preferable,
in my opinion, are policy approaches that target specific government speakers
in response to evidence of abuse in specific contexts, rather than relying on
broad and unsupported conclusions about the danger of government speech
generally.215 In short, policymakers should proceed with caution, preferring the
scalpel to the bludgeon when choosing policy tools for addressing
governmental misuse of its expressive power.
As one example of such a targeted policy response to specific abuses of the
government’s expressive power, recall recent controversies over the federal
government’s allegedly covert speech—executive branch speech that did not
make clear its governmental source.216 Congress could—and, in my opinion,
should—encourage greater executive branch transparency by amending the
longstanding propaganda ban specifically to define such covert speech as
prohibited and to provide meaningful enforcement mechanisms to punish and
deter such speech.
As another example, consider policymakers’ concerns about efforts by the
White House Office of Political Affairs to use government resources to fund
expression to reelect incumbents. In response, a House committee
recommended elimination of that office as well as amendments to the Hatch
Act to create meaningful penalties for violations of that Act.217 This too

214 See Nev. Comm’n on Ethics v. Carrigan, 131 S. Ct. 2343 (2011) (rejecting a legislator’s First
Amendment challenge to a Nevada law prohibiting public officials from voting or advocating with respect to
matters in which the legislator has an actual or perceived conflict of interest and detailing the long history of
such statutes).
215 See YUDOF, supra note 72, at 111–38 (urging legislative bodies to consider the dangers of government
speech in deciding what types of government expression to authorize and to prohibit); Jacobs, supra note 83
(proposing a variety of statutory checks on Article II speakers).
216 See supra notes 88–89 and accompanying text.
217 COMM. ON OVERSIGHT & GOV’T REFORM, U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, THE ACTIVITIES OF THE
WHITE HOUSE OFFICE OF POLITICAL AFFAIRS, at ii (2008).
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exemplifies an appropriately calibrated policy response targeted to specific
instances of government abuse of its expressive power.
CONCLUSION
This Article seeks to reexamine longstanding controversies over the
government’s campaign speech by considering them in light of lessons from
contemporary constitutional debates over campaign finance reform and
government speech more generally. This inquiry invites important and
challenging questions about both the nature of government and the nature of
speech. When is government speech on contested public policy debates most
valuable in facilitating participation in democratic self-governance and
contributing to the dissemination of knowledge—and when, if ever, does such
government expression endanger key constitutional values by drowning out
others’ political speech or by entrenching incumbent political power? Can
government ever simply participate in the marketplace of ideas in contested
issue campaigns, or does its participation in such contests instead frustrate
political competition? Is there any reason to depart from the traditional
assumption that more speech is better than less when the government seeks to
add its voice to the available body of expression?
This Article concludes that government speech on issue campaigns
generally furthers, rather than frustrates, key constitutional values. More
specifically, it finds that transparently governmental campaign speech on
contested ballot and legislative measures is rarely, if ever, more harmful to
First Amendment liberty or equality interests than that of any other speaker
because in such contexts the government is acting as a participant in the
marketplace of ideas, rather than as a regulator. Indeed, such government
campaign speech is often of great value to the public. It enhances political
accountability by informing voters of their governments’ priorities and
preferences, provides a valuable heuristic for those who do not have the time
or expertise to evaluate the competing arguments for themselves, and
sometimes provides a counter to expression from powerful, private sources that
often operate in nontransparent ways.
To be sure, however, the government’s campaign speech should not be
entirely free from constraint. First, the government’s campaign speech on
contested ballot or legislative measures should be considered consistent with
constitutional values only when that speech is transparently governmental in
origin—when the public can clearly identify the message’s governmental
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origins and thus hold the government politically accountable for its views.
Second, government entities’ campaign speech endorsing or opposing specific
candidates raises distinct constitutional threats to First Amendment interests in
constraining incumbents’ self-perpetuation and entrenchment. Finally,
statutory and other nonconstitutional limits on the government’s campaign
speech remain available. The substantial instrumental value of the
government’s issue-related campaign speech to the public, however, should
counsel policymakers to proceed with caution, focusing their efforts to target
identified abuses of the government’s expressive power, rather than relying on
broader and unsupported conclusions about the danger of government
campaign speech generally.

